Divorcing Sexual Harassment from Sex: Lessons from the French by Hébert, L. Camille
Hebert Proof 1 (Do Not Delete) 2/18/2014 11:31 AM 
 
1 
Divorcing Sexual Harassment from Sex: Lessons from the French 
L. CAMILLE HÉBERT* 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the challenges in establishing the existence of actionable sexual 
harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 has been to prove that 
the harassing conduct, even when it is explicitly sexual, has occurred “because 
of . . . sex”—a requirement for actionable sexual harassment. Because sexual 
harassment in the context of the American workplace is prohibited as a form of 
discrimination on the basis of sex, harassment that is not seen as fitting within 
the framework of sex discrimination is not generally considered to be unlawful.2  
Accordingly, the courts have insisted that the harassment to which targets are 
subjected be shown to have been motivated by the sex or gender of that target,3 
and not by other considerations, such as actual or perceived sexual orientation4 
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 1.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17 (2006 & Supp. 2010). 
 2.  It is true that the harassing conduct that is not considered to be based on sex might violate 
other legal prohibitions, such as the tort restrictions on assault and battery or intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, but harassing conduct that is not considered to be based on sex does not violate 
Title VII’s prohibition on sexual harassment. 
 3.  In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998), the United States Supreme 
Court stressed: 
Title VII does not prohibit all verbal or physical harassment in the workplace; it is directed 
only at “discriminat[ion] . . . because of . . . sex.” We have never held that workplace 
harassment, even harassment between men and women, is automatically discrimination 
because of sex merely because the words used have sexual content or connotations. “The 
critical issue, Title VII’s text indicates, is whether members of one sex are exposed to 
disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are 
not exposed.” 
Id. at 80 (emphasis in original) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring)). 
 4.  In the United States, discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is generally not 
prohibited as a matter of federal law, because it is not expressly prohibited, nor is it considered to be 
a form of sex discrimination under Title VII, and is prohibited in only a minority, though a growing 
number, of states. See L. CAMILLE HÉBERT, EMPLOYEE PRIVACY LAW 9-4 – 9-434 (Thomson Reuters 
2012) (reviewing the history and attempted justifications of discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation, as well as case law and statutory authority related to such discrimination, including 
challenges under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which have been rejected by most courts; 
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or simple personal dislike. Accordingly, in a number of cases of both opposite-
sex and same-sex harassment, courts have concluded that explicitly sexually 
denigrating conduct was not motivated by sex, and therefore was not prohibited 
by Title VII.5 
I have explained elsewhere my concerns about the questionable analysis 
that has caused courts to conclude that explicitly sexually denigrating conduct is 
not based on sex,6 and I will not repeat those arguments here. However, my 
concerns about those holdings have caused me to explore the possibility of a law 
of sexual harassment divorced from the “because of . . . sex” requirement—a 
prohibition against sexual harassment in the workplace that does not require a 
showing that the harassment was motivated by sexual desire, gender hostility, or 
sexual stereotyping, or constituted explicitly different activity directed at men 
and women.7 
This possibility, while foreign to the conception of sexual harassment law in 
 
also reviewing discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in the states). 
 5.  See L. Camille Hébert, Sexual Harassment as Discrimination “Because of . . . Sex”: Have We Come 
Full Circle?, 27 OHIO N.U. L. REV 439, 457-80 (2001) (reviewing cases in which lower courts applied 
the “because of. . .sex” requirement and came to different conclusions about the motivations of the 
accused harassers). 
 6.  Hébert, supra note 5, at 480-83; L. Camille Hébert, Sexual Harassment is Gender Harassment, 43 
U. KAN. L. REV. 565, 573-76 (1995) [hereinafter Gender Harassment]. 
 7.  While these may not be the only ways in which to prove that harassment occurred “because 
of . . . sex,” these are the ways in which the courts, particularly the U.S. Supreme Court, have 
indicated that discrimination based on sex can be shown. In Oncale, 523 U.S.at 80-81, the Court 
indicated that harassment could be shown to be based on sex in the following manner: 
Courts and juries have found the inference of discrimination easy to draw in most male-
female sexual harassment situations, because the challenged conduct typically involves 
explicit or implicit proposals of sexual activity; it is reasonable to assume those proposals 
would not have been made to someone of the same sex. The same chain of inference would 
be available to a plaintiff alleging same-sex harassment, if there were credible evidence that 
the harasser was homosexual. But harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual 
desire to support an inference of discrimination on the basis of sex. A trier of fact might 
reasonably find such discrimination, for example, if a female victim is harassed in such sex-
specific and derogatory terms by another woman as to make it clear that the harasser is 
motivated by general hostility to the presence of women in the workplace. A same-sex 
harassment plaintiff may also, of course, offer direct comparative evidence about how the 
alleged harasser treated members of both sexes in a mixed-sex workplace. Whatever 
evidentiary route the plaintiff chooses to follow, he or she must always prove that the 
conduct at issue was not merely tinged with offensive sexual connotations, but actually 
constituted “discrimina[tion] . . . because of . . . sex.” 
Id. at 80-81. And in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), a majority of the members of the 
Court acknowledged that acting on the basis of sexual stereotypes constituted discrimination on the 
basis of gender.  Id. at 250 (“In the specific context of sex stereotyping, an employer who acts on the 
basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of 
gender.”); Id. at 272-73 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (characterizing evidence of reliance on sex 
stereotyping as evidence of discriminatory intent with respect to challenged employment decision). 
Even the dissent in the Price Waterhouse case acknowledged that “[e]vidence of use by decisionmakers 
of sex stereotypes is, of course, quite relevant to the question of discriminatory intent.” Id. at 294 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 I do not mean to suggest that sexually explicit denigrating conduct is not in fact based on one of 
these motivations or otherwise not based on sex, only that so many courts have reached the contrary 
conclusion that alternatives methods of establishing the existence of actionable sexual harassment 
may avoid the difficulties that plaintiffs often have in convincing courts of the unlawfulness of the 
conduct directed against them. 
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the United States,8 is consistent with the law in a number of jurisdictions outside 
the United States. A number of those jurisdictions prohibit both sexual 
harassment and “moral harassment.” Prohibited sexual harassment is generally 
defined as involving conduct that is sexual in nature, although the harm sought 
to be prevented is not focused on discrimination so much as on harm to dignity.9 
Claims of moral harassment seek to regulate derogatory or denigrating 
workplace conduct more generally, reaching beyond conduct that is sexual in 
nature or discriminatorily motivated. Although the precise definition of moral 
harassment differs among jurisdictions, the jurisdictions that recognize such a 
claim generally define the prohibited conduct as conduct directed at a 
subordinate or co-worker that has the purpose or effect of injuring the dignity of 
that employee or adversely affecting his or her employment conditions or 
opportunities.10  In those jurisdictions, a showing of actionable harassment does 
 
 8.  Courts in the United States have expressed concern that prohibiting harassment 
independent of a discriminatory motivation would turn Title VII into a “general civility code.” See, 
e.g., Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80 (“Respondents and their amici contend that recognizing liability for same-
sex harassment will transform Title VII into a general civility code for the American workplace. But 
that risk is no greater for same-sex than for opposite-sex harassment, and is adequately met by 
careful attention to the requirements of the statute.”); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 
(1998) (“These standards for judging hostility are sufficiently demanding to ensure that Title VII does 
not become a ‘general civility code.’ Properly applied, they will filter out complaints attacking ‘the 
ordinary tribulations of the workplace, such as the sporadic use of abusive language, gender-related 
jokes, and occasional teasing.’”) (citations omitted). Similar concerns have been expressed by the 
lower courts.  See, e.g., Terry v. Texas Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 2010 WL 3860369, *2  (E.D. Tex. 2010) 
(“Title VII is not a federal general civility code or a general prohibition against all bad acts.”); Wilson 
v. U.S. Dep’t of Transportation, 759 F. Supp. 2d 55, 67 (D.D.C. 2011) (“Title VII is not a civility code.”). 
The courts have not, however, adequately explained the dangers or risks of a requirement of civility 
in the workplace. 
 9.  See, for example, Belgium’s prohibition on sexual harassment, which prohibits: “all types of 
verbal, non-verbal, or physical behavior of a sexual nature, which the guilty party knows or should 
know will affect the dignity of women and men in the workplace.” Loi relative à la protection contre 
la violence et le harcèlement moral ou sexuel au travail [Law Concerning Protection against Violence 
and Moral or Sexual Harassment at Work] of June 11, 2002, MONITEUR BELGE [MB] [Official Gazette 
of Belgium], June 22, 2002, 28521. This is an unofficial translation by the author of the original French: 
« toute forme de comportement verbal, non-verbal ou corporel de nature sexuelle, dont celui qui s’en 
rend coupable, sait ou devrait savoir, qu’il affecte la dignité de femmes et d’hommes sur les lieux de 
travail ». Unless otherwise indicated, all translations offered in this article are unofficial translations 
by the author. 
 10.  Belgium’s prohibition on moral harassment prohibits “abusive and repeated conduct, from 
sources external or internal to the enterprise or institution, that are manifested particularly in 
behavior, words, threats, actions, gestures, or unilateral writings, having the purpose or effect of 
harming the personality, the dignity, or the physical or psychological integrity of a worker or other 
person to whom the present chapter applies, during the execution of his or work, and putting in 
danger his or work or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating, or offensive 
environment.” Id. In the original French: « les conduites abusives et répétées de toute origine, externe 
ou interne à l’entreprise ou l’institution, qui se manifestent notamment par des comportements, des 
paroles, des intimidations, des actes, des gestes et des écrits unilatéraux, ayant pour objet ou pour 
effet de porter atteinte à la personnalité, la dignité ou l’intégrité physique ou psychique d’un 
travailleur ou d’une autre personne à laquelle le présent chapitre est d’application, lors de l’exécution 
de son travail, de mettre en péril son emploi ou de créer un environnement intimidant, hostile, 
dégradant, humiliant ou offensant ». 
For a discussion of Belgium’s law concerning moral harassment, see Loïc Lerouge, Moral Harassment 
in the Workplace: French Law and European Perspectives, 32 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 109, 137-43 (2010) 
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not require that the harassment be shown to have been inflicted with a 
discriminatory motive or effect, but merely requires a showing of either intent to 
harm or sufficient injury. 
This article will explore whether recognition of a claim of sexual harassment 
focused on dignity rather than discrimination, or even of a gender-neutral claim 
of harassment, similar to a claim of moral harassment in France, might be 
possible within the scope of the American legal system, either as a substitute for, 
or a supplement to, the presently recognized claim of discriminatory harassment 
under Title VII. In so doing, this article will explore the historical and cultural 
differences that have led to the development of these disparate approaches in the 
United States and in France, as well as the challenges that would have to be faced 
in attempting to import aspects of such a discrimination-neutral or gender-
neutral claim of harassment into the law of the United States. 
II. FRANCE’S LAW OF SEXUAL AND MORAL HARASSMENT 
The current state of the law with respect to sexual and moral harassment in 
France reflects the historical development of that law within France, including 
some quite recent events, as well as the influence of the requirements imposed on 
France and French law by its membership in the European Union. Because the 
theoretical basis for harassment law as it originally developed within French law 
differs from the basis for harassment law as required to be incorporated into 
French law by European Union directives, there appear to be two distinct types 
of both sexual harassment and moral harassment recognized in French law. In 
addition, the law concerning sexual harassment and the law concerning moral 
harassment still differ substantially from each other, in spite of some attempts to 
harmonize those different laws. 
A. The Prohibitions of Sexual Harassment 
The prohibitions of sexual harassment appear in both the Penal Code (Code 
Pénal) and the Labor Code (Code du Travail). France’s original provision 
concerning sexual harassment was enacted in 1992,11 as part of the Penal Code, 
and amended in 1998,12 so that the prohibition read as follows: 
The fact of harassing others by issuing orders, uttering threats, using force, or 
exerting serious pressure, with the goal of obtaining favors of a sexual nature by 
a person abusing the authority granted by his or her duties, is punishable by a 
term of one year’s imprisonment and a fine of 100,000 francs.13 
 
[hereinafter Moral Harassment in the Workplace]. 
 11.  Loi 92-684 du 22 juillet 1992 portant réforme des dispositions du code pénal relatives à la 
répression des crimes et délits contre les personnes [Law 92-684 of July 22, 1992 concerning the 
reform of the penal code relative to the prosecution of crimes against persons], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE 
LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 23, 1992, p. 9875. 
 12.  Loi 98-468 du 17 juin 1998 relative à la prévention et à la répression des infractions sexuelles 
ainsi qu’à la protection des mineurs [Law 98-468 of June 17, 1998 on the prevention and punishment 
of sexual offenses and the protection of minors], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE 
[J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], June 18, 1998, p.9255. 
 13.  This is an unofficial translation by the author of the original French: « Le fait de harceler 
autrui en donnant des ordres, proférant des menaces, imposant des contraintes ou exerçant des 
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A similar provision was included in the French Labor Code in 1992. That 
provision originally provided that: 
No employee shall be sanctioned or dismissed for having submitted or having 
refused to submit to acts of harassment from an employer, from its 
representative, or from any person who, by abusing his or her authority 
conferred by his or her duties, has given orders, made threats, imposed force, or 
exercised pressure of any nature on the employee with the goal of obtaining 
favors of a sexual nature for his or her benefit or the benefit of a third party.14 
By their terms, these provisions characterized sexual harassment as acts 
motivated by the goal of “obtaining favors of a sexual nature,” rather than by 
some other purpose, and restricted harassment to actions taken by a person 
abusing his or her authority, thereby prohibiting sexual harassment only when it 
occurred within a system of hierarchy, such as that existing between a superior 
and a subordinate within the context of the workplace.15 The focus of these 
provisions on the abuse of authority through specified types of coercive action 
and the goal of obtaining sexual “favors,” as well as the placement of the Penal 
Code provision in the portion of the code addressing forms of sexual violence 
and aggression, including rape, suggests that the basis of these original 
provisions was to protect women from sexual coercion, whether that coercion 
was accomplished by physical or other types of constraints.16 
The cases decided under this version of the sexual harassment provisions 
indicate that the existence of coercion, including both promises of benefits and 
threats of harm, was an essential aspect of a claim of sexual harassment. In a 
decision by the criminal division of the Court of Cassation (Cour de cassation, 
chamber criminelle), the highest court in the French judiciary,17 the court upheld 
 
pressions graves dans le but d’obtenir des faveurs de nature sexuelle, par une personne abusant de 
l’autorité qui lui confèrent ses fonctions, est puni d’un an d’emprisonnement et de 100 000 F 
d’amende. » CODE PÉNAL [C. PEN.] art. 222-33 (version in effect from June 18, 1998, to Jan. 1, 2002). 
 14.  Loi 92-1179 du 2 novembre 1992 relative à l’abus d’autorité en matière sexuelle dans les 
relations de travail et modifiant le code du travail et le code de procédure pénale [Law 92-1179 of 
November 2, 1992 on the abuse of power in sexual matters in employment relationships and 
modification of the labor code and code of criminal procedure] ; JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE 
FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Nov. 4, 1992, p.15255, art. L. 122-46.. In the original 
French : « Aucun salarié ne peut être sanctionné ni licencié pour avoir subi ou refusé de subir les 
agissements de harcèlement d’un employeur, de son représentant ou de toute personne qui, abusant 
de l’autorité que lui confèrent ses fonctions, a donné des ordres, proféré des menaces, imposé des 
contraintes or exercé des pressions de toute nature sur ce salarié dans le but d’obtenir des faveurs de 
nature sexuelle à son profit ou au profit d’un tiers. » 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  See Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court], Commentaire, decision No. 2012-240 
QPC, May 4, 2012, 2-3, available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-
constitutionnel/root/bank/download/2012240QPCccc_240qpc.pdf (discussing the placement of the 
prohibition on sexual harassment in the section of the Penal Code dealing with sexual aggression and 
other offenses committed with moral or physical constraints). 
 17.  The function of the Court of Cassation is to review decisions of the lower courts in order to 
determine whether those decisions have accurately applied the law to the facts of those cases. The 
Court does not resolve the merits of a dispute but generally proclaims whether the lower court 
decision is in compliance with the law, in which case it is accepted, or not in compliance with the law, 
in which case it is rejected and generally returned to the lower court. Cour de cassation, About the 
Court, COURDECASSATION.FR, http://www.courdecassation.fr/about_the_court_9256.html (last 
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the decision of the court of appeals concluding that sexual harassment had 
occurred based on both promises of benefits if the target of harassment had sex 
with her supervisor, and also threats of disadvantage if she continued to refuse; 
the court of appeals had found sexual harassment to have been established even 
though the target of harassment had continued to progress in her career at the 
company in spite of her refusal to submit to the harasser’s sexual advances, 
noting that the harasser had intended to keep her in his service in order to 
achieve his goals of obtaining sexual acts from her.18 Similarly, in another 
decision, the criminal division of the Court of Cassation upheld the lower court’s 
conclusion that a manager had engaged in sexual harassment by giving a 
subordinate a promotion when she agreed to have sex with him and then 
relegating her to cleaning toilets when she refused to continue the relationship.19 
Some courts seem to have interpreted the concept of the coercive action 
required to prove sexual harassment quite broadly, to include abusive action by 
the harasser aimed at accomplishing the submission to sexual acts by the target 
of harassment. For example, the Court of Appeals of Paris held that acts of 
harassment could include, in addition to touching imposed on an employee, 
words spoken with the object of obtaining sexual acts, including professional and 
sexual denigration and threats, insults, and abuse of all kinds uttered in the event 
of a refusal to grant sexual favors.20 
Conversely, the absence of coercion, even when unwanted sexual advances 
occurred in the context of a hierarchical workplace relationship, was deemed 
fatal to a sexual harassment claim. Accordingly, in another case, the criminal 
division of the Court of Cassation upheld the court of appeals’ dismissal of 
claims of sexual harassment against a manager who was found to have made 
repeated sexual advances to a subordinate in whom the court noted he had a 
sexual interest, including “forgetting” to rent a second hotel room on a business 
trip and therefore inviting her to share his single bed.21 The court of appeals had 
noted the absence of “blackmail” and had indicated that “an attitude of 
seduction, even devoid of tact and delicacy, does not constitute the offense of 
harassment, no more than simple conventional social signals initiated in a 
fashion to express the demonstration of an inclination.”22 This case seems to 
 
visited October 6, 2013). The English translation of the word “cassation,” in the context of a decision 
or a judgment, is “annulment” or “quashing.” HARRAP’S DICTIONNAIRE JURIDIQUE, FRANÇAIS-
ANGLAIS 19 (Dalloz 2004). 
 18.  Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] crim., Nov. 20, 2002, No. 02-
81.635, available at 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction=rechExpJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEXT00
0007602905&fastReqId=1375350769&fastPos=1 (concerning acts of harassment occurring between 
1995 and 1999). 
 19.  Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] crim., Feb. 18, 2004, No. 03-
83.302, available at 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction=rechExpJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEXT00
0007614704&fastReqId=525365472&fastPos=1  (concerning acts of harassment occurring between 
1995 and 1997). 
 20.  Cour d’Appel[CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 18 e  ch.., 18 Jan. 1996, reported in Michel 
Miné & Francis Saramito, Le harcèlement sexuel, DROIT OUVRIER, Février 1997, at 76-77 . 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] crim., Jan. 19, 2005, No. 04-
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confirm the terms of the statute that it was not enough that the advances and 
other conduct be unwanted and without the consent of the target of harassment; 
instead, this version of the prohibition on sexual harassment required some 
showing of coercion, whether physical, psychological, or economic. 
The use of the term “harassment” (harcèlement) in the prohibition of sexual 
harassment raised a question whether the actions on which a claim was based 
had to be repeated in order to be unlawful under the statute, even though the 
discussion in the Senate at the time the term “harassment” was added to the 
Penal Code provision indicated that the legislators anticipated that even a single 
act could constitute actionable harassment.23 In fact, some objection was made to 
the use of that term as being insufficiently precise because the dictionary 
definition of the French verb « harceler » (to harass) included the concept of 
repetition.24 That term was apparently adopted in spite of this objection because 
of the general acceptance of that term to describe the offense being prohibited.25  
It is not entirely clear how, or whether, this issue was resolved by the judiciary in 
applying the statute. The court of appeals, in at least one case involving  an 
employee who contended that she was discharged for reporting a single act of 
 
83.443, available at 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction=rechExpJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEXT00
0007611862&fastReqId=1538106140&fastPos=1 (concerning events occurring in 2000). In the original 
French : «une attitude de séduction même dénuée de tact ou de délicatesse ne saurait constituer le 
délit de harcèlement, pas davantage que de simples signaux sociaux conventionnels lancés de façon à 
exprimer la manifestation d’une inclination ».  
 23.  See Sénat, Première Session Ordinaire de 1991-1992, Séance du jeudi 3 octobre 1991, Débats 
Parlementaires, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF 
FRANCE], Oct. 3, 1991, at 2627-28 (discussion suggesting that single act, such as sexual blackmail, 
would be sufficient to state a claim of harassment under proposed provision). See also Damien Roets, 
L’Inquiétante métamorphose du délit de harcèlement sexuel, 26 RECUEIL DALLOZ 2059 (2002) (noting that 
the parliamentary debate revealed that the intent of the legislators was to permit a finding of 
harassment from a single act, but also that the verb « harceler » generally connotates repetition); 
Françoise Dekeuwer-Defossez, Le harcèlement sexuel en droit français : discrimination ou atteinte à la 
liberté ?, LA SEMAINE JURIDIQUE, ÉD. G., 1993, no. 13, at 3662 (indicating that it was clearly stated in the 
parlimentary debates that a sufficiently serious single act, such as blackmail, would qualify as sexual 
harassment, and that the term  “harcèlement sexuel,” as a French translation of the anglo-saxon term 
“sexual harassment,” was chosen for its power of evocation rather than for its semantic precision). 
 24.  Sénat, Première Session Ordinaire de 1991-1992, Séance du jeudi 3 octobre 1991, Débats 
Parlementaires, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF 
FRANCE], Oct. 3, 1991, p. 2627 (discussing the appropriateness of using the term « harcèlement, » 
noting that the dictionary Robert defines the term « harceler » to mean : “to torment, to subject 
without respite to repeated attacks, to fast, constant assaults”/In French: « tourmenter, soumettre 
sans répit à des attaques réitérées, à de rapides assauts incessants »). 
 25.  Id. (statement of M. Charles Jolibois, indicating that notion of sexual harassment was known 
and that “it is indisputable that we should use the term “to harass.”/In French: « il faut 
incontestablement utiliser le mot « harceler ».) Even those who opposed use of the term 
“harcèlement” noted the general use of that term to describe the offense being prohibited. See id. 
(statement of M. Michel Dreyfus-Schmidt that “what all the world calls sexual harassment must be 
punished”/In French: « ce que tout le monde appelle le harcèlement sexuel doit être puni »). 
Interestingly, in spite of the fact that the origin of the English verb “harass” is French, neither the 
dictionary definition of the term, nor the common understanding of the term, is tied so directly to the 
concept of repetition, at least in the United States. See THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 773 
(Elizabeth J. Jewell & Frank Abate eds., Oxford University Press 2001) (the “core sense” of the word 
“harass” is “subject to aggressive pressure or intimidation,” while the “subsense” of the word is 
“make repeated small-scale attacks on (an enemy)”). 
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harassment of another, concluded that “the law establishes that harassment 
results from a repetition of acts and does not correspond to a single act.”26 Most 
cases, however, did not state any such requirement, although it is also true that 
most litigated cases of sexual harassment did in fact involve repeated acts.27 
In 2002, as part of the Social Modernization Act,28 the Penal Code provision 
on sexual harassment was modified to remove the requirements that the 
harassment occur by certain types of coercive actions and by a person abusing 
his or her authority, so that the law simply provided that: 
The fact of harassing another person with the goal of obtaining favors of a sexual 
nature shall be punished by a term of one year’s imprisonment and a fine of 
15,000 euros.29 
Similarly, after changes made by the Social Modernization Act and the 
recodification of the Labor Code, the provision on sexual harassment, then 
contained in Art. L. 1153-1 of the French Labor Code, merely provided: 
Acts of harassment by all persons with the goal of obtaining sexual favors for 
one’s benefit or the benefit of a third party are prohibited.30 
The apparent purpose of this change was to broaden the definition of sexual 
harassment to ensure that these provisions were not limited to harassment 
accomplished by an abuse of authority and to harmonize the sexual harassment 
provisions of the Penal Code with the sexual harassment provisions contained in 
the Labor Code, as well as to harmonize the sexual harassment provisions in 
both codes with the newly enacted provisions on moral harassment in both 
codes.31 The effect of this change was to no longer require that the harassment 
occur within the context of a hierarchical relationship, but the amendment also 
removed the express requirements that the harassment be accomplished by use 
of coercive actions. It is unclear whether this change was intended to remove all 
requirement of coercion from a claim of sexual harassment or, instead, to 
broaden the notion of the types of constraints that might be used in order to 
 
 26.  Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Angers, soc., June 7, 2011, No. 10/01241, 
available at http://legimobile.fr/fr/jp/j/ca/49007/2011/6/7/10_01241/. In the original French : « La 
jurisprudence, cependant, établit que le harcèlement résulte d’une répétition de faits et ne correspond 
pas à un acte unique. » 
 27.  See Roets, supra note 23 (noting that the law has not been clearly settled on this point, but 
that most cases involved repeated acts of harassment). 
 28.  Loi 2002-73 du 17 janvier 2002 de modernisation sociale [Law 2002-73 of January 17, 2002 of 
social modernization], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF 
FRANCE], Jan. 18, 2002, p. 1008. 
 29.  In the original French: « Le fait de harceler autrui dans le but d’obtenir des faveurs de nature 
sexuelle est puni d’un an d’emprisonnement et de 15 000 € d’amende. » CODE PÉNAL [C. PEN.] art. 
222-33 (version in effect from Jan. 18, 2002, to Feb. 10, 2010). 
 30.  CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] art. L. 1153-1 (« Les agissements de harcèlement de toute 
personne dans le but d’obtenir des faveurs de nature sexuelle à son profit ou au profit d’un tiers sont 
interdits. »). 
 31.  See Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court], Commentaire, decision No. 2012-240 
QPC, May 4, 2012, 2, available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-
constitutionnel/root/bank/download/2012240QPCccc_240qpc.pdf (discussing  provisions on moral 
harassment in the Penal Code and the Labor Code, discussed in infra text accompanying notes 88-
103). 
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obtain sexual acts from another person. 
Cases applying this version of the provisions on sexual harassment indicate 
that establishing a claim of sexual harassment required a showing that the 
harasser actually was seeking to obtain sexual acts by his or her conduct. The 
criminal division of the Court of Cassation rejected the appeal of a convicted 
harasser that the claim against him had not been established because he did not 
have any actual intent to obtain sexual acts by his advances to a subordinate 
employee but was only joking, finding his appeal to be merely an attack on the 
fact-finding of the lower court.32 The court, however, seemed to confirm that 
such an intent was in fact required as an element of the offense.33 
The requirement of intent to obtain sexual acts, however, was not 
interpreted as a requirement that the harasser be seeking to actually obtain the 
act of sexual intercourse.34 The criminal division of the Court of Cassation in 
another case rejected the appeal of a convicted harasser who made numerous 
sexual advances against a subordinate employee, including asking for kisses and 
trying to kiss her, putting his hands under her sweater and on her buttocks, and 
talking about sex in an obscene and vulgar manner, but argued that he could not 
have been seeking sexual acts because he suffered from erectile problems that 
made intercourse impossible; the lower court had indicated that the harasser’s 
sexual problems were not relevant to whether his sexual advances constituted an 
intent to obtain sexual acts.35 Similarly, the Court of Appeals of Paris, applying 
the prohibition of sexual harassment, interpreted the term “favors of a sexual 
nature” broadly to mean “all acts of a sexual nature, and particularly simple 
physical touching intended to fulfill a sexual fantasy or to accentuate or to cause 
sexual desire.”36 
With respect to the issue of coercion, it appears that the courts still required 
that the acts committed to obtain sexual acts be accomplished by means of some 
type of coercion, or at least by taking advantage of the vulnerability of 
employees. For example, in a case involving a male employee who directed 
repeated sexual acts at several female employees, including making sexual 
 
 32.  Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] crim., Jan. 31, 2012, No. 11-
82.985, available at 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction=rechJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEXT000025
470967&fastReqId=1778231722&fastPos=1. See also Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for 
judicial matters] crim., Nov. 10, 2004, Bull. crim. No. 280, p. 1056, No. 03-87.986, available at 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction=rechJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEXT000007
069892&fastReqId=1633055263&fastPos=1. 
 33.  Id. See also Cour de cassation [Cass.} [supreme court for judicial matters] crim., Nov. 10, 2004, 
No. 03-87.986 (reversing decision of court of appeals, which had found a teacher guilty of sexual 
harassment for telling a 14-year-old student that he loved her and kissing her three times on the 
mouth, because the court of appeals did not explain how his behavior constituted aggressive 
behavior with the goal of obtaining sexual acts from the student). 
 34.  See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] crim., Sept. 30, 2009, No. 
09-80.971, available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction=rech 
JuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEXT000021194011&fastReqId=744822691&fastPos=1. 
 35. Id. 
 36.  Cour d’Appel [CA] [regional court of appeal], Paris, 18 e ch., Jan. 18, 1996,, reported in 
Michel Miné, Le harcèlement sexuel, Droit Ouvrier, p 76-77 (Fevrier 1997).  In French:« tout acte de 
nature sexuelle, et notamment les simples contacts physiques destinés à assouvir un phantasme 
d’ordre sexuel, voire à accenteur ou provoquer le désir sexuel ». 
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advances, putting his hand on the thigh of one co-worker and trying to kiss her 
in the elevator, and placing his head between the thighs of another co-worker 
while she was sitting at a table and holding her down on a table while he placed 
whipped cream on her stomach and then licked it off, the court of appeals 
rejected his contention that his acts constituted simple workplace banter. In 
concluding that this conduct constituted sexual harassment, the court of appeals 
relied on the fact that the harasser took advantage of the targets of his 
harassment, who were experiencing distress because of difficult family 
situations.  The criminal division of the Court of Cassation upheld the decision of 
the court of appeals.37 Similarly, although in a case not involving employment, 
the criminal division of the Court of Cassation reversed a decision of the court of 
appeals that had found a teacher guilty of sexual harassment for telling a 14-
year-old student that he loved her and kissing her on the mouth three times, 
because the court of appeals had not explained how his conduct constituted 
aggressive action seeking sexual conduct.38 
The expansion of the penal provision on sexual harassment in connection 
with the Social Modernization Act was intended to allow the provision to be 
applied to a broader range of sexually harassing behavior, but that action 
ultimately doomed the provision, for this section of the Penal Code was held 
unconstitutional on May 4, 2012, by the French Constitutional Council (the 
Conseil Constitutionnel) as insufficiently precise for failing to define the 
elements that constituted the crime.39 The Constitutional Council held that the 
provision violated the principle that punishment could not be imposed if 
criminal offenses were not defined in terms sufficiently clear and precise; the 
provision therefore violated both Article 24 of the Constitution and Article 8 of 
the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of August 26, 1789.40 
Accordingly, the Council declared that the penal provision on sexual harassment 
was repealed effective with the publication of the decision in the Official Journal 
of the French Republic (Journal Officiel de la République Française) and that the 
repeal was effective as to all proceedings that had not been definitively resolved 
as of that date.41 
The decision of the Constitutional Council addressed only the 
constitutionality of the Penal Code provision on sexual harassment, because that 
was the issue raised in the application for the priority preliminary ruling on an 
issue of constitutionality (question prioritaire de constitutionnalité or QPC) that 
was before it. However, the effect of that ruling on the validity of the Labor Code 
provisions on sexual harassment seems to have been the subject of some debate. 
The Commentary issued by the Secretary General of the Constitutional Council 
 
 37.  Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] crim., May 11, 2010, No. 09-
84.011, available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction=rech 
JuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEXT000021194011&fastReqId=744822691&fastPos=1. 
 38.   Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] crim., Nov. 10, 2004, Bull. 
crim. No. 280, p. 1056, No. 03-87.986, available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do 
?oldAction=rechJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEXT000007069892&fastReqId=1633055263&fastPos=1. 
 39.  Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2012-240 QPC, May 4, 2012, 
J.O.du 5 mai 2012, p. 8015. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. 
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suggested that the ruling also called into question the validity of the similar 
Labor Code provisions, indicating that “[i]f their provisions are not contested, 
they are necessarily linked to the fate of the QPC because their content is close to 
that of the contested provision.”42 On the other hand, a circular issued by the 
Ministry of Justice emphasized that the decision of the Constitutional Council 
did not affect the non-penal aspects of the sexual harassment provisions of the 
Labor Code, which it indicated remained in effect: 
It is appropriate to emphasize, on the other hand, that the decision of the 
Constitutional Council raises no objection to the non-penal aspects of the issue. . . 
the principle of the ban on harassment, the prohibition of dismissal of one who 
refuses harassment or who testifies, breach of discipline [by the harasser], the 
obligation of supervision by the employer . . . provided by articles L. 1153-1 to L. 
1153-6 and L. 1154-1 of the Labor Code.43 
The reenactment of a sexual harassment law, after repeal of the previous 
provision, was viewed as a matter of some urgency, both because of the vacuum 
created by the absence of a criminal penalty for sexually harassing conduct and 
because of the possible implications of that decision on the law of the workplace 
more generally.44 Barely three months after the repeal, new provisions on sexual 
harassment were enacted into both the Penal Code and the Labor Code,45 with 
the unanimous approval of both the Senate and the National Assembly.46 Those 
 
 42.  Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court], Commentaire, decision No. 2012-240 
QPC, May 4, 2012, 3, available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-
constitutionnel/root/bank/download/2012240QPCccc_240qpc.pdf. In the original French : « Si ces 
dispositions ne sont pas contestées, elles sont nécessairement liées au sort de la QPC puisque leur 
contenu est proche de celui de la disposition contestée. ». 
 43.  Circular of Ministère de la Justice et des Libertés, CRIM-AP No. 10-780-D2 (May 10, 2012), p. 
4, http://www.avft.org/IMG/pdf/Circulaire_10-05-2012_-_harcelement_sexuel-2.pdf.. In the 
original French : « Il convient en revanche de souligner que la décision du Conseil constitutionnel n’a 
aucune incidence sur l’aspect non pénal de la question (principe de la prohibition du harcèlement, 
interdiction de licencier celui qui refuse du harcèlement ou qui témoigne, faute disciplinaire, 
obligation de surveillance de l’employeur . . . prévus par les articles L. 1153-1 à L. 1153-6 et L. 1154-1 
du code du travail. »See also Christophe Radé, Abrogation du délit de harcèlement sexuel : quelles 
conséquences en droit du travail ?, 21 RECUEIL DALLOZ 1392 (2012) (expressing the opinion that the 
regime of sexual harassment in the Labor Code is more complete than the Penal Code provision and 
that the decision of the Constitutional Council should not be able to abrogate Article L 1153-1 of the 
Labor Code, which defines sexual harassment, but only the penalty provision of that Code, Art. L 
1155-2). 
 44.  Loïc Lerouge, Actualités, Harcèlement : nouvelle dispositions issues de la loi du 6 août 2012, 
Droit Social, N° 10 (Octobre 2012). 
 45.  The new law was not retroactive, but became effective on August 7, 2012, with its 
publication in the Journal Officiel, and applies to actions that are committed as of August 8, 2012.  
Circular of Ministère de la Justice, CRIM No. 2012-15/E8,  Présentation des dispositions de droit 
pénal et de procédure pénale de la loi n° 2012-954 du 6 août 2012 relative au harcèlement sexuel 
(Aug. 7, 2012), http://www.textes.justice.gouv.fr/art_pix/1_1_circulaire_07082012.pdf. 
 46.  Communiqué de presse de Christiane Taubira, garde des sceaux, ministre de la Justice 
[Press release of Christiane Taubira, Keeper of the Seals, Minister of Justice], « Harcèlement sexuel : 
adoption définitive de la nouvelle loi » [English translation] (July 31, 2012), 
http://www.presse.justice.gouv.fr/archives-communiques-10095/archives-des-communiques-de-
2012-12363/harcelement-sexuel-adoption-definitive-de-la-nouvelle-loi-24473.html (noting that both 
the French Senate and National Assembly adopted the law relating to sexual harassment with 
unanimity and expressing the opinion that the unanimous vote by Parliament sends a strong message 
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provisions contain a two-part definition of sexual harassment. The first part of 
the Penal Code provision indicates that: 
Sexual harassment is the fact of imposing on a person, in a repeated manner, 
words or behavior with a sexual connotation, which undermine his or her 
dignity by reason of their degrading or humiliating nature or create against him 
or her an intimidating, hostile or offensive situation.47 
The second part of the definition in the Penal Code provides that 
incorporated into the definition of sexual harassment is “the fact, even if not 
repeated, of using any form of serious pressure with the real or apparent goal of 
obtaining an act of a sexual nature, if it is sought for the benefit of the actor or the 
benefit of a third party.”48 
The Labor Code provisions are similar, incorporating the same two parts of 
the definition of sexual harassment from those Penal Code provisions. The Labor 
Code provisions on sexual harassment provide that: 
No employee shall be required to submit to facts  
1.  of sexual harassment, consisting of repeated words or behavior with a sexual 
connotation, which undermine his or her dignity by reason of their degrading or 
humiliating nature or create against him or her an intimidating, hostile or 
offensive situation; 
2. incorporated into sexual harassment, consisting of any form of serious 
pressure, even if not repeated, exerted with the real or apparent goal of obtaining 
an act of a sexual nature, if it is sought for the benefit of the actor or the benefit of 
 
about the fight against sexual harassment). 
 47.  Loi 2012-954 du 6 août 2012 relative au harcèlement sexuel [Law 2012-954 of August 6, 2012, 
concerning sexual harassment], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL 
GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Aug. 7, 2012, p. 12021; CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN.] art. 222-33(I).  In the original 
French : « Le harcèlement sexuel est le fait d’imposer à une personne, de façon répétée, des propos ou 
comportements à connotation sexuelle qui soit portent atteinte à sa dignité en raison de leur caractère 
dégradant ou humiliant, soit créent à son encontre une situation intimidante, hostile ou offensante. » 
 48.  Loi 2012-954 du 6 août 2012 relative au harcèlement sexuel [Law 2012-954 of August 6, 2012, 
concerning sexual harassment], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL 
GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Aug. 7, 2012, p. 12021; CODE PENAL [C. PEN.] art. 222-33-2.  In the original 
French : “Est assimilé au harcèlement sexuel le fait, même non répété, d’user de toute forme de 
pression grave dans le but réel ou apparent d’obtenir un acte de nature sexuelle, que celui-ci soit 
recherché au profit de l’auteur des faits ou au profit d’un tiers. »  The use of the phrase « est assimilé 
au harcélement  sexuel » (“is incorporated into sexual harassment” or “is considered to be sexual 
harassment”)  for this portion of the definition was intended to address concerns expressed that the 
definition of the French word « harcélement » connotes repetition, such that a single act could not 
constitute harassment ; use of this phrase allows a single act of harassment to be actionable, if the 
requirements of the statute are met, while still respecting the dictionary definition of the term). 
The reenactment of the sexual harassment provisions into the Penal Code also provided for an 
increase in penalties for violation of either part, to a term of imprisonment of two years and a fine of 
30,000 euros, with enhanced penalties of three year’s imprisonment and a fine of 45,000 euros for 
sexual harassment involving certain aggravating circumstances, such as harassment by a person 
abusing the authority of his or her position, harassment of a minor under 15 years of age, abuse of 
persons who are particularly vulnerable because of a number of personal or economic situations, if 
that vulnerability is known or apparent to the harasser, and harassment accomplished by several 
persons acting together. CODE PENAL [C. PEN.] art. 222-33(III). 
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a third party.49 
The Labor Code also includes other provisions relating to sexual 
harassment. For example, the Labor Code provides that employees may not be 
discriminated against or be subjected to adverse action in connection with 
employment decisions because the individual submitted to or refused to submit 
to harassing conduct, even if the harassing conduct did not consist of repeated 
actions;50 employees also may not be discriminated against or subject to adverse 
employment action for having testified about or having reported acts of sexual 
harassment.51 Another provision of the Code imposes an obligation on 
employers to “take all necessary actions with a view of preventing acts of sexual 
harassment.”52 
The new provisions of the Penal and Labor Codes on sexual harassment 
retain the notion from the original version of the law to define as sexual 
harassment acts aimed at obtaining sexual acts, although this version makes clear 
that some use of coercion is required for actionable harassment, in the form of 
 
 49.  CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] art. L. 1153-1. In the original French : « Aucun salarié ne doit 
subir des faits: 
1° Soit de harcèlement sexuel, constitué par des propos ou comportements à connotation sexuelle 
répétés qui soit portent atteinte à sa dignité en raison de leur caractère dégradant ou humiliant, soit 
créent à son encontre une situation intimidante, hostile ou offensante ; 
2° Soit assimilés au harcèlement sexuel, consistant en toute forme de pression grave, même non 
répétée, exercée dans le but réel ou apparent d’obtenir un acte de nature sexuelle, que celui-ci soit 
recherché au profit de l’auteur des faits ou au profit d’un tiers. » 
 50.  CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] art. L. 1153-2 (“No employee . . . may be sanctioned, dismissed, 
or be subjected to discrimination, directly or indirectly (intentionally or unintentionally) . . .  for 
having submitted or having refused to submit to facts of sexual harassment as defined in Art. L. 1153-
1, including, in the case mentioned in section 1 of that article, if the words or behavior have not been 
repeated.”). In the original French : « Aucun salarié . . . ne peut être sanctionné, licencié ou faire 
l’objet d’une mesure discriminatoire, directe ou indirecte . . . pour avoir subi ou refusé de subir des 
faits de harcèlement sexuel tels que définis à l’article L.1153-1, y compris, dans le cas mentionné au 1° 
du même article, si les propos ou comportements n’ont pas été répétés. » The Labor Code provides 
that violations of this provision are punishable by one year’s imprisonment and a fine of 3,750 euros.  
CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] art. L. 1155-2. 
A corresponding provision was inserted into the Penal Code by the law reenacting the sexual 
harassment provision. That provision, contained in Article 225-1-1 of the Penal Code, provides that: 
“Discrimination consists of any distinctions made between persons because they have submitted or 
refused to submit to facts of sexual harassment as defined in Art. 222-33 or testified of those facts, 
including, in the case mentioned in section I of that article, if the words or behavior have not been 
repeated.” In the original French: « Constitue une discrimination toute distinction opérée entre les 
personnes parce qu’elles ont subi ou refusé de subir des faits de harcèlement sexuel tels que définis 
à l’article 222-33 ou témoigné de tels faits, y compris, dans le cas mentionné au I du même article, si 
les propos ou comportements n’ont pas été répétés. » CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN.] art. 225-1-1. The penalty 
for violation of this provision is three year’s imprisonment and a fine of 45,000 euros, when the 
discrimination consists of the refusal to hire, the sanctioning, or the dismissal of an individual. CODE 
PÉNAL [C. PÉN.] art. 225-2. 
 51.  CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] art. L. 1153-3 (“No employee may be sanctioned, dismissed, or 
subjected to discrimination for having testified of facts of sexual harassment or having reported 
them.”). In the original French : « Aucun salarié ne peut être sanctionné, licencié ou faire l’objet d’une 
mesure discriminatoire pour avoir témoigné des agissements de harcèlement sexuel ou pour les avoir 
relatés. » 
 52.  CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] art. L. 1153-5.  In the original French: « L’employeur prend 
toutes dispositions nécessaires en vue de prévenir les faits de harcèlement sexuel. »  
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any type of “serious pressure.”53 The new law also makes clear that harassment 
occurs whether the harasser is motivated by an actual aim to obtain sexual acts 
or only appears to be seeking that goal and whether he or she seeks those acts for 
his or her own benefit or for the benefit of another. And this provision 
definitively resolves the question left open by the prior versions of the 
prohibition on sexual harassment: even a single act of serious pressure, when the 
aim of that pressure is to obtain sexual acts, is expressly stated to be sufficient to 
constitute a legal claim of sexual harassment. Accordingly, regardless of the 
dictionary definition of the French verb «harceler» (to harass), the legal definition 
of the term “sexual harassment” need not necessarily consist of repeated acts, 
when that harassment has the aim of obtaining sexual acts. 
But the new provisions also introduce a new conception of sexual 
harassment into the provisions of the Labor and Penal Codes, that of the use of 
repeated words or actions with a sexual connotation to impair one’s dignity, 
through degrading or humiliating conduct, or to create an intimidating, hostile, 
or offensive situation for the harassed individual. For this type of sexual 
harassment, repetition of acts is expressly required. There is no requirement that 
the sexually related acts be motivated by an intent to obtain sexual acts from the 
target of harassment or, indeed, any express requirement that the acts be 
motivated by any intent at all. Instead, the provision focuses on conduct that 
harms the dignity of the target of harassment or subjects him or her to a hostile, 
intimidating, or offensive situation. There is also no express requirement of 
coercion, in the form of serious pressure or otherwise, in this part of the 
definition in either the Penal or Labor Code provisions, although the use of the 
term “imposing” in the Penal Code,54 as well as the prohibition on requiring an 
 
 53.  The nature of sexual harassment set forth in this portion of the definition has been described 
as a form of “sexual blackmail” (in French, « chantage sexuel »).  See Sénat, Session Extraordinaire de 
2011-2012, Séance du mercredi 11 juillet 2012, Compte rendu intégral, , JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA 
REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAIS [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 12, 2012, p. 2009 (statement of Mme 
Christiane Taubira, garde de sceaux, ministre de la justice, introducing project of law on new sexual 
harassment provisions); Assemblée Nationale, Session Extraordinaire de 2011-2012, Séances du mardi 
24 juillet 2012, Compte rendu intégral, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAIS [J.O.] [OFFICIAL 
GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 25, 2012, p. 2367 (statement of Mme Pascale Crozon, rapporteure de la 
commission des lois constitutionnelles, discussing « chantage sexuel »). 
 54.  See Sénat, Session Ordinaire de 2011-2012, Rapport d’Information No. 596, fait au nom de la 
commission des affaires sociales (1), de la commission des lois constitutionnelles, de législation, du 
suffrage universel, du Règlement et d’administration générale (2) et de la délégation aux droits des 
femmes et à l’égalité des chances entre les hommes et les femmes (3), par le groupe de travail sur le 
harcèlement sexuel (4), June 15, 2012, p. 46 (statement of Mme Maryvonne Caillibotte, directrice des 
affaires criminelles et des grâces, ministère de la justice, explaining that the non-acceptance of the 
victim was an element of the proposed definition of sexual harassment, as reflected in the use of term 
“behavior imposed”/in French « comportements imposés ») ; id. at 112 (statement of Mme Marie-
Thérèse Bruguière, expressing the view that use of the term “imposed” was preferable to use of the 
term “non-consensual” to refer to the acts constituting harassment, because that would not require 
the victim to establish that she had refused the acts). 
See also Sénat, Session Extraordinaire de 2011-2012, Séance du mercredi 11 juillet 2012, Compte rendu 
intégral, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAIS [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 12, 
2012, p. 2009 (statement of Mme Christiane Taubira, garde de sceaux, ministre de la justice, 
introducing project of law on new sexual harassment provisions and explaining that use of word 
« imposer » (to impose) was intended to mean that the victim did not consent to or desire the acts of 
harassment but submitted to them, but that there is no requirement that the victim show that she 
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employee to submit to harassment in the Labor Code, presumably suggest that 
the words or behavior being inflicted on the target of harassment are unwanted. 
The same reading is presumably suggested by the notion that the words and 
behavior undermine dignity because of their “degrading and humiliating” 
nature, because it is difficult to imagine that the legislators thought that 
degrading and humiliating conduct would be inflicted with the consent of the 
employee. 
The conception of harassment reflected in this new definition, however, is 
not so much new as borrowed from the definition of sexual harassment found in 
the European Union directives on discrimination, which were required to be 
incorporated into French law on discriminatory harassment; those directives, as 
discussed below,55 also make use of the concepts of violation of dignity and 
creation of a hostile or offensive environment.56 
One might reasonably wonder whether, by apparently borrowing the 
language concerning violation of dignity and creation of a hostile or offensive 
environment from the Labor Code provision on discriminatory harassment and, 
in turn, from the European Union directives on discrimination on which this 
Labor Code provision is based, this current articulation of sexual harassment also 
intended to borrow the underlying theoretical underpinning of those provisions, 
that is, the concept of discrimination as a motivating factor for the harassment. 
But other factors suggest that that is in fact not the case. 
In general, French law appears to view the concepts of harassment and 
discrimination as analytically distinct, as reflected in the separation of those 
concepts in different parts of the Penal and Labor Codes. The history behind the 
original adaptation of the sexual harassment provisions in the Penal Code 
demonstrates that this separation of the provisions on harassment and 
discrimination in different parts of the Codes was not accidental. As originally 
proposed, the provision that became the prohibition against sexual harassment 
was located in the portion of the Penal Code on discrimination and did not use 
the term “harassment.”57  An amendment in the Senate added a reference in the 
provision to the term “harassment,” and the National Assembly moved the 
provision out of the portion of the Code on discrimination and into the portion 
on crimes of sexual aggression.58 
In addition, there was a good deal of opposition to defining harassment as a 
form of discrimination under French law at all, as reflected in the fact that the 
national government failed to do so until after the issuance of two warnings and 
a reasoned opinion from the European Commission to France for failure to 
 
expressed disapproval of the acts in a direct manner). 
 55.  See infra text accompanying notes 105 to 114. 
 56.  Although the word “situation” rather than “environment” was used in the enacted version 
of the new sexual harassment provisions, the language initially proposed by the government in the 
Project of Law introduced into the Senate was “environment,” which was changed to “situation” 
during consideration by the Senate.  For a discussion of the likely reason for and effect of this change, 
see infra text accompanying notes 81 to 82. 
 57.  Sénat, Première Session Ordinaire de 1991-1992, Séance du jeudi 3 octobre 1991, Débats 
Parlementaires, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF 
FRANCE], Oct. 3, 1991, p. 2627-28. 
 58.  See Dekeuwer-Defossez, supra note 23. 
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correctly transpose European Directives on discrimination into French national 
law.59 This failure was in part motivated by the existence of different conceptions 
of harassment under European Union law and French national law. That is, 
while French national law did not consider harassment to be a form of 
discrimination, for the European Commission, harassment, or at least sexual 
harassment, was inherently discriminatory in nature.60 One of the failures of 
transposition for which France was cited was the fact that harassment was not 
defined as a form of discrimination.61 
That this difference of opinion about the conceptual basis for and the 
theoretical underpinnings of a claim of sexual harassment has not been 
completely resolved seems to be reflected in the fact that French national law did 
not replace its preexisting prohibition of sexual harassment with the one 
mandated by the European Union, but simply added what was required by the 
European Commission as an additional claim of discriminatory harassment.62 In 
fact, although the definition provided by the law transposing the directive into 
national law clearly seems to be describing a claim of harassment, the term 
“harassment” is not used in the law.63 This continuing tension between 
competing conceptions of sexual harassment makes it very unlikely that the 
French legislators intended to silently incorporate any conception or requirement 
of a discriminatory motive into its “own” version of a sexual harassment claim. 
The express provisions of the new statute do not contain any requirement 
that actionable sexual harassment be based on any discriminatory motive. The 
definition of sexual harassment contained in that new statute references dignity 
and the creation of a hostile situation, as well as the concept of coercion of sexual 
acts, but not discriminatory motive. In fact, as discussed below, even the 
provision of the Labor Code defining discriminatory sexual harassment does not 
expressly require a showing of a discriminatory motive, as long as the 
harassment has a sexual connotation.64 
 
 59.  See Marie-Thérèse Lanquetin, Discriminations: le loi d’adaption au droit communautaire du 27 
mai 2008, DROIT SOCIAL, Juillet-Août 2008, n° 7/8, at 778.  See also Memorandum on “‘Employment 
Directive (2000/78/EC)” from the European Union, No. 08/68 (Jan. 31, 2008), 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-08-68_en.htm (list of Member States to which a 
reasoned opinion or letter of formal notice will be sent, including France, listed under reasoned 
opinion for “[i]ncorrect definitions of direct and indirect discrimination and harassment”). 
 60. Lanquetin, supra note 59, at 781. 
 61.  Sénat, Session Ordinaire de 2007-2008, Rapport d’information No. 252 de Mme Christiane 
Hummel, Sénateur, Apr. 1, 2008, p. 11 (discussing the differences between France’s definition of 
harassment and the European Union’s preferred definition of harassment). Other failures with 
respect to France’s definition of sexual harassment was that that definition required repeated actions, 
while the European Directive’s definition did not, and that the notion of degradation of workplace 
conditions was narrower than the notion of an intimidating environment. Id. 
 62.  Michel Miné, Discriminations: une transposition laborieuse . . ., Libertés et pouvoirs, Revue 
de Droit du Travail, Septembre 2008, p. 532, 533-34 (discussing the potential problems created by the 
fact that the different provisions on harassment were maintained in the Labor and Penal Codes). 
 63.  Id. at 533 (noting the fact that the law recognizing certain forms of harassment as a form of 
discrimination “curiously does not use the term of harassment”). In the original French: « Grâce au 
droit communautaire, la loi permet enfin de reconnâitre certains harcèlements comme des 
discriminations, sur le terrain civil, même si la loi n’emploie pas, curieusement, le terme de 
harcèlement. » 
 64.  See infra text following note 114. 
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In addition, the explanation of the statute in the circular issued by the 
Ministry of Justice65 does not reference any requirement that a claim of sexual 
harassment be based on any discriminatory motive. That document mentions 
discrimination in two different contexts. First, with respect to sexual harassment, 
the document addresses discrimination against a person who has been subjected 
to sexual harassment,66 which, as discussed above, is also prohibited under the 
new sexual harassment provisions.67  Second, that document discusses, in a 
separate section, a clarification in the law that makes explicit that discrimination 
on the basis of gender identity is prohibited by the anti-discrimination provisions 
of the Labor and Penal Codes.68 Tellingly, the provisions on discrimination 
because of sexual harassment are codified with the Code provisions on sexual 
harassment, while the provisions on discrimination because of gender identity 
are codified in the section of the Code that also prohibits discriminatory 
harassment. This separation further demonstrates that the prohibition on sexual 
harassment under French law is separate from, and not based upon, any notion 
of discriminatory motivation.69 
The preliminary documents (les travaux préparatoires) of the new statute 
also seem to confirm this separation between the notions of harassment and 
discrimination.  For example, the Impact Study of the Project of Law issued by 
the Ministry of Justice with respect to the new sexual harassment provisions 
indicate that one of the objectives of the new law was to “reestablish coherence 
between the Penal Code and the Labor Code and to distinguish clearly the 
question of the definition and penalization of sexual harassment from that of the 
definition and penalization of discrimination.”70 The discrimination of which the 
study speaks appears to be discrimination against the victims of sexual 
harassment, but this language still suggests the desire to draw a clear distinction 
between sexual harassment and discrimination. The study also makes clear the 
 
 65.  Circular of Ministère de la Justice, CRIM No. 2012-15/E8, supra note 45. 
 66.  Id. at 9-12 (discussing provision of new statute providing a penalty for discrimination 
against a person who is subject to discrimination resulting from acts of sexual harassment). 
 67.  See supra text accompanying note 50. 
 68.  Circular of Ministère de la Justice, CRIM N° 2012-15/E8, supra note 45, at 12-13 (discussing 
provision of new statute providing a penalty for discrimination against a person who is subject to 
discrimination resulting from acts of sexual harassment). 
 69.  The provision on gender identity was originally proposed to be added to the new sexual 
harassment statute as an aggravating factor for sexual harassment, so that harassment motivated by 
one’s gender identity would be punishable by increased penalties.  See Sénat, Session Extraordinaire 
de 2011-2012, Séance du mercredi 11 juillet 2012, Compte rendu intégral, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA 
REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAIS [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 12, 2012, p.2062-65 (discussing 
sexual orientation and identity in relation to the vulnerability of the victim and gender identity’s 
status as an aggravating factor).  That amendment was withdrawn and a new amendment was 
proposed, which would add gender identity to the anti-discrimination provisions of the Penal Code 
and the Labor Code; that amendment was adopted.  Sénat, Session Extraordinaire de 2011-2012, 
Séance du jeudi 12 juillet 2012, Compte rendu intégral, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE 
FRANÇAIS [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 13, 2012, p. 2125-29. 
 70.  Etude d’impact pour le projet de loi relatif au harcèlement sexuel [Impact Study for the 
project of law related to sexual harassment] 31 (June 2012). In the original French : « rétablir la 
cohérence entre le code pénal et le code du travail et distinguer clairement la question de la définition 
et de la pénalisation du harcèlement sexuel de celle de la définition et de la pénalisation des 
discriminations ». 
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government’s position, in explaining why consultation with the Supreme 
Council for Professional Equality Between Woman and Men (le conseil supérieur 
de l’égalité professionnelle entre les femmes et les hommes) was not mandatory 
with respect to the draft sexual harassment law, that sexual harassment is not 
discriminatory because, even though it generally affects women more than men, 
it can exist without regard to the sex of the victim or the perpetrator.71 
Interestingly, however, in spite of the general view among those involved in 
the enactment of the new sexual harassment provisions that sexual harassment is 
not a form of discrimination, several participants in the process expressed the 
view that the existence of sexual harassment within French society and in its 
workplaces does implicate issues of equality between men and women. For 
example, in discussing the newly introduced project of law relating to sexual 
harassment, Madame Najat Vallaud-Belkacem, the minister of women’s rights 
and the government’s spokesperson, stated: “Indeed, the issue of sexual 
harassment is serious; without visible signs that it is considered to be intolerable, 
we do not build a society of justice, of respect, and of equality between women 
and men.”72 Even more strongly, she asserted the government’s view that 
“sexual harassment is a manifestation of a society based on inequality between 
women and men.”73 
 
 71.  Id. at 38-39. A similar desire to draw a clear distinction between sexual harassment and 
discrimination is found in the report of the working group created by the Senate in connection with 
the consideration of the new sexual harassment provisions, in which the need was expressed to 
distinguish between harassment based on gender, seen as a form of discrimination, and sexual 
harassment, which consisted of sexual acts.  Sénat, Session Ordinaire de 2011-2012, Rapport 
d’Information No. 596, fait au nom de la commission des affaires sociales (1), de la commission des 
lois constitutionnelles, de législation, du suffrage universel, du Règlement et d’administration 
générale (2) et de la délégation aux droits des femmes et à l’égalité des chances entre les hommes et 
les femmes (3), par le groupe de travail sur le harcèlement sexuel (4), June 15, 2012, p. 88 (statement of 
Mme Brigitte Gonthier-Maurin, présidente de la Délégation aux droits des femmes). 
 72.   Sénat, Session Extraordinaire de 2011-2012, Séance du mercredi 11 juillet 2012,  Compte 
rendu intégral, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAIS [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], 
July 12, 2012, p. 2013 (In the original French, «En effet, la question du harcèlement sexuel est grave : 
sans signaux visibles qu’il est considéré comme intolérable, on ne construit pas une société de justice, 
de respect et d’égalité entre les femmes et les hommes. »).  Similarly, when Madame Najat Vallaud-
Belkacem spoke in favor of the proposed legislation to the National Assembly, she indicated that acts 
of sexual harassment are intolerable, not only because  of the suffering that they imposed on the 
victims but that they are intolerable for the entire society to be founded on justice, respect, and 
equality between men and women. Assemblée Nationale, Session Extraordinaire de 2011-2012, 
Séances du mardi 24 juillet 2012, Compte rendu intégrale, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE 
FRANÇAIS [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 25, 2012, p. 2365 (In French, « Ces actes sont 
intolérables.  Ils le sont pour eux-mêmes, pour les souffrances imposées aux victimes, mais ils le sont 
aussi pour la société tout entière, la société que nous voulons fondée sur la justice, sur le respect et sur 
l’égalité entre les femmes et les hommes. »). 
 73.  Sénat, Session Extraordinaire de 2011-2012, Séance du mercredi 11 juillet 2012, Compte 
rendu intégral, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAIS [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], 
July 12, 2012, p. 2045 (statement of Madame Najet Vallaud-Belkacem) (In French, « Madame Meunier, 
vous aussi avez rappelé que le harcèlement sexuel est une manifestation d’une société fondée sur 
l’inégalité entre les femmes et les hommes. »). Similarly, in her statement to the National Assembly, 
Madame Pascale Crozon, rapporteure, indicated that inequality between men and women was a 
source of sexual harassment. Assemblée Nationale, Session Extraordinaire de 2011-2012, Séances du 
mardi 24 juillet 2012, Compte rendu intégral, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAIS [J.O.] 
[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 25, 2012, p. 2367. 
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A similar view was expressed by Madame Christiane Demontès, member of 
the Senate and reporter for the views of the Commission on Social Affairs with 
respect to the issue of sexual harassment: “[T]he question of sexual harassment 
has close ties with subjects that are at the heart of the concerns of the 
Commission on Social Affairs. I think of the quality of the life of work, the 
prevention of psychosocial risks, and the professional equality between men and 
women.”74 And Madame Bariza Khiari, acting as president of the Senate on the 
consideration of the new sexual harassment provisions, expressed the view that: 
“The Constitutional Council, perhaps unwittingly, gave us the opportunity to 
improve the law and harden the repression of sexual harassment to advance 
equality between men and women.”75 Perhaps the most strongly stated view of 
the connection between sexual harassment and equality or inequality was 
expressed by Madame Pascale Crozon, the reporter for the Commission on 
Constitutional Laws, who seemed to suggest that not only was sexual 
harassment caused by gender inequality but that there was a link between sexual 
harassment and sexism: “We must all be convinced that professional equality is 
the best prevention against sexual harassment and that the realization of 
equality . . . occurs through the prevention of sexism.”76 
It should be noted that while the new provisions on sexual harassment 
borrow some concepts from the Labor Code provisions on discriminatory 
harassment and the European Union directives on discrimination, there are still 
important differences between the definitions of sexual harassment and 
discriminatory harassment. In particular, the definition of discriminatory 
harassment seems to focus solely on the purpose or effect of sexually harassing 
conduct, while the new provision on sexual harassment also seeks to define the 
 
 74.  Sénat, Session Extraordinaire de 2011-2012, Séance du mercredi 11 juillet 2012, Compte 
rendu intégral, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAIS [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], 
July 12, 2012, p. 2017 (In the original French,  « Par conséquent, la question du harcèlement sexuel 
entretient des liens étroits avec des sujets qui sont au cœur des préoccupations de la commission des 
affaires sociales. Je pense à la qualité de la vie du travail, à la prévention des risques psychosociaux et 
à l’égalité professionnelle entre les hommes et les femmes. »). 
But see id. at 2029 (statement of M. Jean-Jacques Hyest) (objecting to the introduction of allusions of 
gender into the debate because “the victims of sexual harassment have not been the object of 
discrimination; they are all equal, and must be protected equally.” In French, « les victimes de 
harcèlement sexuel n’ont pas à faire l’objet de discrimination: elles sont toutes égales, et doivent être 
protégées également. »). 
 75.  Sénat, Session Extraordinaire de 2011-2012, Séance du jeudi 12 juillet 2012, Compte rendu 
intégral, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAIS [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 13, 
2012, p. 2148 (In French, « Le Conseil constitutionnel, peut-être involontairement, nous a donné 
l’occasion de parfaire la loi et de durcir la répression du harcèlement sexuel pour faire progresser 
l’égalité entre les hommes et les femmes. »). 
 76.  Assemblée Nationale, Session Extraordinaire de 2011-2012, Séances du mardi 24 juillet 2012, 
Compte rendu intégral, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAIS [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF 
FRANCE], July 25, 2012, p. 2367 (statement of Mme Pascale Crozon, rapporteure de la commission des 
lois  constitutionnelles [reporter of the commission on constitutional laws]) (In French, « Nous devons 
tous être convaincus que l’égalité professionnelle est la meilleure prévention contre le harcèlement 
sexuel et que la réalisation de l’égalité . . . passe par la prévention du sexisme. »).  See also  id. at  2374 
(statement of Mme Ségolène Neuville, rapporteure de la délégation aux droits des femmes et à 
l’égalité des chances entre les hommes et les femmes [reporter of the delegation of rights of women 
and equality of opportunities between men and women]) (suggesting relationship between sexism 
and sexual stereotypes and the existence of sexual harassment). 
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nature of conduct that can lead to sexual harassment, by referencing the 
“degrading or humiliating nature” of that conduct.77 The Impact Study 
accompanying the Project of Law from the Ministry of Justice explained that this 
language was chosen to lessen the possibility that the new provision would be 
found insufficiently precise by the Constitutional Council; that study explains 
that the government believed that a focus on only the consequences of conduct 
would not allow criminalization of that conduct, while including requirements 
for the conduct itself would avoid any constitutional problems.78 It appears that 
the language in the new sexual harassment provisions requires a showing that 
the conduct claimed to constitute sexual harassment was in fact degrading or 
humiliating in nature, in addition to a showing that the conduct actually harmed 
dignity or created a hostile situation. 
Differences in language between the two provisions also raise an issue as to 
whether a showing of intent is necessary to establish the existence of sexual 
harassment under this new provision. The use of the terms “purpose or effect” in 
the discriminatory harassment provisions would seem to indicate that no 
showing of intent is required, because either an intent or a consequence of 
harming dignity or creating a hostile environment would be sufficient. As 
explained below,79 that is the manner in which similar language in the moral 
harassment provisions of the Labor Code has been interpreted. The effect of the 
absence of this language from the new sexual harassment provisions in the Labor 
Code is unclear. Certainly there is no express requirement of intent in that 
provision, because by its terms, the new provision on sexual harassment merely 
prohibits actions that cause harm to dignity or create a hostile environment, 
suggesting that the focus is on the consequence of, and not the intent behind, 
harassing conduct.  Alternatively, the deletion of the term “purpose” might have 
been intended to impose a requirement that the harmful effects on dignity and 
the work environment actually occur in order for actionable sexual harassment to 
be shown, rather than that the actions merely have the intent to bring about those 
effects. It is also possible that the deletion of the term “effect” might have been 
intended to suggest that sexual harassment cannot be established merely by the 
consequences of that conduct, but this would appear to be a strained 
interpretation of a statutory provision that contains no express requirement of 
 
 77.  In the original French, the new sexual harassment provisions refer to acts with a sexual 
connotation « qui soit portent atteinte à sa dignité en raison de leur caractère dégradant ou 
humiliant» et « soit créent à son encontre une situation intimidante, hostile ou offensante ».  CODE 
PENAL [C. PEN.] art. 222-33(I); CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] art. L. 1153-1, while the provisions on 
discriminatory harassment refer to acts with a sexual connotation « ayant pour objet ou pour effet 
une dégradation des conditions de travail susceptible de porter atteinte à ses droits et à sa dignité», 
CODE PENAL [C. PEN.] art. 222-33-2; CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] art. L. 1152-1. 
 78.  Etude d’impact pour le projet de loi relatif au harcèlement sexuel [Impact Study for the 
project of law related to sexual harassment] 32-34 (June 2012).  Curiously, cited in support of this 
conclusion is the fact that the statutory provisions on moral harassment, which also focus on harm to 
dignity, have been held to be constitutional by the Constitutional Council; those provisions, however, 
as discussed below at infra text accompanying notes 88-103, focus only on the purpose or effect of 
harassing conduct, not its nature.  It is difficult to understand how a focus on the purpose or effect of 
morally harassing behavior would be valid, while a similar focus on the purpose or effect of sexually 
harassing behavior would not. 
 79.  See infra text accompanying notes 95 to 96. 
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intent.80 
Another difference between the language of the new sexual harassment 
provisions and the provision on discriminatory harassment is the requirement 
that the conduct create “an intimidating, hostile or offensive situation” against 
the target of harassment for a sexual harassment claim, while the discriminatory 
harassment provisions require that the harassing conduct create an intimidating, 
hostile, degrading, humiliating, or offensive environment. Interestingly, the 
descriptors of “degrading” and “humiliating” are used in the sexual harassment 
provisions to define the nature of the conduct that must exist for actionable 
sexual harassment, rather than the consequences of that conduct. In addition, 
with respect to the consequences of that conduct, the sexual harassment 
provisions require the creation of an intimidating, hostile or offensive “situation” 
rather than an “environment.” The addition of the words « à son encontre » 
(against him or her) also seem to indicate the requirement of a more direct effect 
of the harassment on the particular target of harassment. 
An explanation for this difference in language is found in the report of the 
working group created by the Senate in connection with consideration of the new 
sexual harassment provisions, suggesting that the term “environment” might be 
too imprecise and indicating that the term “situation” might more objectively 
describe the particular climate suffered by a target of sexual harassment.81 A 
similar view was expressed during the debates on the new sexual harassment 
provisions, during consideration of an amendment to substitute the term 
“situation” for “environment.”82 
Although sexual harassment has been prohibited in both the Labor Code 
and the Penal Code since 1992, most of the cases applying those provisions have 
involved decisions of the criminal courts, applying the Penal Code provision, 
rather than decisions of the labor courts, applying the Labor Code provisions. 
This is probably not surprising, given the original focus of the definition of 
sexual harassment on the abuse of authority and coercion and its apparent links 
with sexual violence and aggression. And given that the Court of Cassation 
 
 80.  With respect to the sexual harassment provision of the Penal Code, a requirement of intent is 
likely to be read into the provisions of the statute, similar to what has happened with respect to the 
Penal Code provisions on moral harassment, on the ground that harassing conduct cannot be 
criminally penalized without a showing of deliberate action on the part of the perpetuator of 
harassment. See infra text accompanying note 96. 
 81.  Sénat, Session Ordinaire de 2011-2012, Rapport d’Information No. 596, fait au nom de la 
commission des affaires sociales (1), de la commission des lois constitutionnelles, de législation, du 
suffrage universel, du Règlement et d’administration générale (2) et de la délégation aux droits des 
femmes et à l’égalité des chances entre les hommes et les femmes (3), par le groupe de travail sur le 
harcèlement sexuel (4), June 15, 2012, p. 10, 91-92. 
 82.  See Sénat, Session Extraordinaire de 2011-2012, Séance du mercredi 11 juillet 2012, Compte 
rendu intégral, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAIS [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], 
July 12, 2012,  p. 2040 (statement of M. François Pillet) (in addition to suggesting that use of the word 
« situation » was more objective than the word « environnement, » he indicated that the word 
« environnement » was only a translation of the English word « environment »); id. at 2051-53 
(discussion and adoption of amendment in Senate). See also Assemblée Nationale, Session 
Extraordinaire de 2011-2012, Séances du mardi 24 juillet 2012, Compte rendu intégral, JOURNAL 
OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAIS [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 25, 2012, p. 
2361(statement of Mme Christiane Taubira) (explaining why the legal commission preferred the term  
« situation » to  « environnement »). 
Hebert Proof 1 (Do Not Delete) 2/18/2014  11:31 AM 
22 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 21:1 2013 
followed a practice of conforming the law concerning sexual harassment under 
both codes, it is likely that the focus on the Penal Code provisions resulted in a 
more restrictive definition of sexual harassment than might have otherwise been 
the case.83 Indeed, one might suppose that this focus on the criminal aspects of 
sexual harassment is at least partially responsible for what has been generally 
viewed as the chronic underenforcement of sexual harassment law in France.84 
While consideration of the new sexual harassment provisions was directly 
motivated by the decision of the Constitutional Council to invalidate the 
previous version of the statute, it appears that the government used that 
opportunity to expand and strengthen the definition of sexual harassment under 
French law, at least in part to address the sense that French law had not 
previously taken the issue of sexual harassment seriously.85 In doing so, it is 
 
 83.  See Élisabeth Fortis, Harcèlement moral en droit pénal et en droit du travail, unité ou dualité?, 1482 
SEMAINE SOCIALE LAMY 8 (2011) (noting that the Court of Cassation has opted for a unified 
interpretation of sexual harassment and that the action has admittedly posed an obstacle to providing 
remedies for sexual harassment in the context of employment); id. at 10 (discussing the links between 
the offense of sexual harassment and sexual aggression and suggesting that legislators may have 
conceived of sexual harassment as a milder form of sexual violence). 
 84.  See Assemblée Nationale, Rapport No. 86 sur le projet de loi (No. 82), adopté par le Sénat 
après engagement de la procédure accélérée, relatif au harcèlement sexuel [Report No. 86 regarding 
the project of law adopted by the Senate related to sexual harassment], July 18, 2012, p. 13 (describing 
survey conducted in 2007 by department in Paris of sexual violence against women, indicating that 
45% of the respondents indicated having heard sexist jokes at work, 14% reported being subjected to 
pornography at work, and 14% reported having received sexually aggressive verbal advances); id. at 
15 (data collected by prosecutors indicate that between 800 and 900 new cases of sexual harassment 
were brought each year between 2003 and 2008, but that between 2003 and 2010, there were only 70 
to 85 offences each year resulting in condemnation); id. at 22 (statistics provided by the Ministry of 
Justice indicate that although a penalty of imprisonment is pronounced in 78% of case of 
condemnations, the sentence is usually suspended, and in the 2 to 4 cases each year in which 
imprisonment is actually ordered, the average period of imprisonment is between 2 and 3.8 months). 
See also Etude d’impact pour le projet de loi relatif au harcèlement sexuel [Impact Study for the 
project of law related to sexual harassment] 11-12 (June 2012) (reporting statistics concerning the very 
low number of cases in which the offense of discrimination against a victim of sexual harassment for 
reporting or refusing to submit to sexual harassment resulted in condemnation between 1994 and 
2008); Assemblée Nationale, Session Extraordinaire de 2011-2012, Séances du mardi 24 juillet 2012, 
Compte rendu intégral, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAIS [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF 
FRANCE], July 25, 2012, p. 2372 (statement of Mme Catherine Lemorton, présidente de la commission 
des affaires sociales [English translation]) (noting that in a country with a population of 63 million, 
there are on average 80 cases a year in which individuals are condemned for sexual harassment). 
See also Sénat, Session Ordinaire de 2011-2012, Rapport d’Information No. 596, June 15, 2012, p. 31 
(Mme Isabelle Steyer, avocate de la Fédération nationale « Solidarité femmes », noting that the former 
criminal offense of sexual harassment was little used, partly because it was not understood by the 
police, detectives, and judges) ; id. at 94 (statement of M. François Molins, procureur de la 
République, indicating that very few cases of sexual harassment  result in condemnations, with only 
two such cases in Paris in 2010 and only one such case in 2011). 
 85.  This intent is reflected in the discussions in the Senate and National Assembly of the new 
sexual harassment provisions. See Assemblée Nationale, Session Extraordinaire de 2011-2012, Séances 
du mardi 24 juillet 2012, Compte rendu intégral, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE 
[J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 25, 2012, p. 2367 (statement of Mme Pascale Crozon, 
rapporteure) (noting that language from the European directives was used in part because those 
guidelines cover a very wide spectrum of possible situations of sexual harassment); Sénat, Session 
Extraordinaire de 2011-2012, Séance de mardi 31 juillet 2012 Compte rendu intégral,, JOURNAL 
OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Aug. 1, 2012, p. 2745 
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possible that the new sexual harassment provisions, focusing not just on efforts 
to obtain sexual acts but also on degrading and humiliating conduct of a sexual 
nature that undermines dignity or creates a hostile environment, may reflect, or 
may result in, a fundamental change in the way that sexual harassment is viewed 
under French law. No longer linked only to sexual coercion, but instead also 
invoking dignitary harm and creation of hostile or intimidating situations, the 
broader definition of sexual harassment should be seen to be applicable to a 
broader range of conduct and circumstances and more linked, under the Labor 
Code, to injuries to the workplace environment.86 In addition, much of the 
discussion of sexual harassment by French legislators during consideration of the 
new sexual harassment provisions, while not establishing a claim based on 
discrimination, seemed to recognize and give credence to the ways in which 
sexual harassment implicates and is related to issues of gender equality. It will 
take some time, however, to determine how this new statute will be used by 
litigants and applied by the courts.87 
B. The Prohibitions of Moral Harassment 
In addition to the prohibitions of sexual harassment contained in the French 
Penal and Labor Codes, those codes also contain prohibitions of moral 
harassment. The provisions on moral harassment were enacted as part of the 
Social Modernization Act in 2002.88 The adoption of these provisions resulted 
from a national discussion of this phenomenon in France, following the 1998 
 
(statement of Mme Christiane Demontès) (indicating the double objective of the text of the new 
sexual harassment provisions—to respond to the gap left by the decision of the Constitutional 
Council invalidating the law and to bring the definition of sexual harassment in French law closer to 
the approach of the European directives).  See also Assemblée Nationale, Session Extraordinaire de 
2011-2012, Séances du mardi 24 juillet 2012, Compte rendu intégral, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA 
REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 25, 2012, p. 2382 (statement of 
Mme. Sonia Lagarde) (suggesting that the abrogation of the sexual harassment law by the 
Constitutional Council might be used to address the fact that sexual harassment has not always been 
addressed with the seriousness that is required). 
 86.  There are indications in the discussions surrounding the enactment of the new sexual 
harassment provisions that the new definitions might lead to an understanding of sexual harassment 
under French law less focused on solely harm to the individual and more focused on the systemic 
harms caused to the workplace in general, similarly to the way that moral harassment is viewed, 
leading to an obligation on the part of the employer to prevent the risks associated with sexual 
harassment. Assemblée Nationale, Session Extraordinaire de 2011-2012, Séances du mardi 24 juillet 
2012, Compte rendu intégrale, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAIS [J.O.] [OFFICIAL 
GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 25, 2012, p. 2427 (statement of Mme Pascale Crozon). 
 87.  Because the statute is not retroactive, judicial pronouncements on the meaning of the new 
statute will have to await cases that arise on or after August 8, 2012. Cases involving sexual 
harassment presently being decided by the Court of Cassation involve situations from 2008 and 
earlier; current sexual harassment cases from the Courts of Appeals addressing issues of sexual 
harassment involve situations that arose three to four years before the enactment of the current 
student. See review of cases from Legifrance.gouv.fr, a public service that makes judicial decisions 
publicly available on an electronic basis (last visited October 6, 2013). 
 88.  Loi 2002-73 du 17 janvier 2002 de modernisation sociale [Law 2002-73 of January 17, 2002 of 
social modernization], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF 
FRANCE], Jan. 18, 2002, p. 1008, Art. 169, p. 1043.  The provision was originally codified in Art. L 122-
49 before recodification of the Labor Code, effective May 1, 2008.  Ordonnance  No. 2007-329 du mars 
2007 relative du code du travail (Mar. 12, 2007). 
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publication of a book by psychiatrist Marie-France Hirigoyen titled Le harcèlement 
moral: la violence perverse au quotidien.89 She defined moral harassment in the 
context of the workplace as “all abusive conduct manifested particularly by 
behavior, words, acts, gestures or writings, which are capable of undermining 
the personality, dignity or the physical or mental integrity of a person, 
endangering his or her employment, or degrading the workplace atmosphere.”90 
In addition to adopting her label for this experience, many of the concepts 
expressed in her definition of moral harassment were ultimately included in the 
legal prohibitions of the offense, including the notions of degradation of 
workplace conditions and endangering of employment, undermining physical 
and mental integrity, and harming dignity. 
The provisions on moral harassment are contained in Art. 222-33-2 of the 
Penal Code and Art. L. 1152-1 to 1152-6 of the Labor Code. This portion of the 
Penal Code provides that: 
The fact of harassing another by repeated acts having the purpose or effect of 
deteriorating his or her working conditions and that are likely to violate his or 
her rights and dignity, impair his or her physical or mental health or jeopardize 
his or her professional future, is punishable by two years’ imprisonment and a 
fine of 30,000 euros.91 
Similarly, article L. 1152-1 of the French Labor Code provides that “No 
 
 89.  Marie-France Hirigoyen, LE HARCELEMENT MORAL : LA VIOLENCE PERVERSE AU QUOTIDIEN 
(Syros 1998).  For a discussion of the origins of the French law of moral harassment, see Moral 
Harassment in the Workplace, supra note 10, at 114-19. 
 90.  Hirigoyen, supra note 91, at 55. In the original French: « toute conduite abusive se 
manifestant notamment par des comportements, des paroles, des actes, des gestes, des écrits, pouvant 
porter atteinte à la personnalité, à la dignité ou à intégrité physique ou psychique d’une personne, 
mettre en péril l’emploi de celle-ci ou dégrader le climat de travail. » 
 91.  CODE PÉNAL [C. PEN.] art. 222-33-2. In the original French: « Le fait de harceler autrui par 
des agissements répétés ayant pour objet ou pour effet une dégradation des conditions de travail 
susceptible de porter atteinte à ses droits et à sa dignité, d’altérer sa santé physique ou mentale ou de 
compromettre son avenir professionnel, est puni de deux ans d’emprisonnement et de 30 000 € 
d’amende. »  Before the enactment of the new Penal Code provision on sexual harassment, the 
criminal penalty associated with moral harassment, like that of sexual harassment, was one year’s 
imprisonment and a fine of 15,000 euros. However, the penalty associated with moral harassment is 
not subject to enhancement based on aggravating circumstances, as is the penalty associated with 
sexual harassment. See discussion of sexual harassment penalties in note 48, supra. 
After the sexual harassment provision of the Penal Code was declared unconstitutional by the 
Constitutional Council, the Court of Cassation was asked to submit a QPC to the Council on the 
constitutionality of the Penal Code provisions on moral harassment. Both the criminal division and 
the social division of the Court of Cassation refused to do so, concluding that it was not necessary 
because the Constitutional Council had already declared those provisions to be in conformity with 
the Constitution in its decision of January 12, 2002 concerning the Social Modernization Act,  Conseil 
constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2001-455 DC, Rec. 49. The Court of Cassation 
held that the Penal Code provision on moral harassment was not affected by the decision of the 
Constitutional Council concerning the sexual harassment provision. Cour de  cassation [Cass.] 
[supreme court for judicial matters] crim., July 11, 2012, Bull. crim., No. 170, No. 11-88114, available at 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction=rechJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEXT000026
181166&fastReqId=722333599&fastPos=1; Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial 
matters] soc., July 11, 2012, Bull. civ. V, No. 220, No. 12-40051, available at 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction=rechJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEXT000026
183102. 
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employee shall be subjected to repeated actions of moral harassment, which have 
the purpose or effect of deteriorating working conditions and that are likely to 
violate his or her rights and dignity, impair his or her physical or mental health 
or jeopardize his or her professional future.”92 The Labor Code contains 
additional provisions similar to the additional provisions relating to sexual 
harassment. For example, the provisions on moral harassment prohibit an 
employee from being discriminated against or subjected to adverse employment 
action for having submitted to or having refused to submit to repeated acts of 
moral harassment, or for having reported or having testified about those acts.93 
Employers are also under an obligation to take “all necessary actions with a view 
of preventing acts of moral harassment.”94 
Cases applying the Labor Code provisions on moral harassment confirm the 
statutory language indicating that repeated acts constitute moral harassment 
when they have the “purpose or effect” of the deterioration of working 
conditions, such that actionable moral harassment can exist without regard to the 
intention of the harasser; the social division (chambre sociale) of the Court of 
Cassation has so held.95 Interestingly, although the provision on moral 
harassment in the Penal Code uses exactly the same language with respect to 
“purpose or effect,” in both an earlier and a subsequent decision, the criminal 
division of the Court of Cassation confirmed the holding of the court of appeals 
that the criminal offense of moral harassment must involve intentional action on 
the part of the perpetrator of harassment.96 
 
 92.  CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] art. L. 1152-1 (In the original French: «Aucun salarié ne doit 
subir les agissements répétés de harcèlement moral qui ont pour objet ou pour effet une dégradation 
de ses conditions de travail susceptible de porter atteinte à ses droits et à sa dignité, d’altérer sa santé 
physique ou mentale ou de compromettre son avenir professionnel.»). 
 93.  CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] art. L. 1152-2 (“No employee may be sanctioned, dismissed, or 
subjected  to discriminatory measures for having submitted or having refused to submit to acts of 
repeated moral harassment or for having testified of those acts or having reported them.”). In the 
original French : « Aucun salarié . . .ne peut être sanctionné, licencié ou faire l’objet d’une mesure 
discriminatoire, directe ou indirecte, . . . pour avoir subi ou refusé de subir des agissements répétés 
de harcèlement moral ou pour avoir témoigné de tels agissements ou les avoir relatés. »  The 
violation of this provision is punishable by one year’s imprisonment and a fine of 3,750 euros.  CODE 
DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] art. L. 1155-2. 
 94.  CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] art. L. 1152-4. In the original french : « L’employeur prend 
toutes dispositions nécessaires en vue de prévenir les agissements de harcèlement moral. » 
 95.  Cour de cassation [Cass. soc.,] [supreme court for judicial matters] Nov. 10, 2009, Bull. civ. V, 
No. 248, No. 08-41497, available at  http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/ 
affichJuriJudi.do?idTexte=JURITEXT000021270373; Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for 
judicial matters] soc., Jan. 28, 2010, No. 08-42616, http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/ 
affichJuriJudi.do?idTexte=JURITEXT000021768871. See Loïc Lerouge, La constitution du harcèlement 
moral au travail indépendamment de l’intention de son auteur, note sous Cass. Soc. 10 nov. 2009 n° 08-
41.497, Petites Affiches, n° 28, 9 février 2010, p. 18-21 (discussing how the reliance of the Court of 
Cassation on the “purpose” or “effect” language of the Labor Code provision on moral harassment 
resulted in the conclusion that moral harassment exists without regard to the intention of the 
harasser, thereby significantly enlarging the scope of actions that might be found to be moral 
harassment. 
 96.  Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] crim., June 21, 2005, Bull. 
crim., No. 187, p. 661, No. 04-86936, available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/ 
affichJuriJudi.do?idTexte= JURITEXT000007069102&dateTexte=; Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme 
court for judicial matters] crim., June 8, 2010, No. 10-80570, http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/ 
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This willingness of the Court of Cassation to allow the same language in the 
Penal Code and the Labor Code to be interpreted differently with respect to 
moral harassment contrasts sharply with the attitude of the Court toward the 
sexual harassment provisions. This suggests that the fact that criminal courts 
applying the Penal Code are likely to be more restrictive than labor courts 
applying the Labor Code will not result, as has been true of sexual harassment, in 
a restrictive reading of the moral harassment provisions of the Labor Code. In 
fact, the cases decided under the Labor Code provisions, as discussed below, 
seem to support this assumption. The relatively broader reading of the 
provisions on moral harassment as compared with the provisions on sexual 
harassment also likely reflects the fact that the majority of cases dealing with 
moral harassment have been decided by labor courts under the Labor Code, 
rather than by criminal courts under the Penal Code, unlike cases dealing with 
sexual harassment. 
For example, the courts have confirmed that as long as the deterioration of 
working conditions has occurred, a claim of actionable moral harassment 
requires only that the harassing conduct is likely to cause the harms specified in 
the statute, not that it actually caused those harms. Accordingly, the criminal 
division of the Court of Cassation held that harassment need not take place 
within the context of a hierarchical relationship in order to violate the statute, in 
that moral harassment can be established even if the harasser is a workplace 
subordinate of the target of harassment without the actual authority to bring 
about harm to one’s professional future.97 
The social division of the Court of Cassation rejected the court of appeals’ 
attempt to limit actionable moral harassment to acts that occur over an extended 
period of time, concluding that a subordinate who was subjected to degrading 
working conditions and denigrating comments over a short period of time could 
still establish the existence of moral harassment.98 However, the social division of 
 
affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction=rechJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEXT000022457458&fastReqId=1643918403&
fastPos=1 (noting the court of appeals reliance on the harasser’s deliberate action exceeding his 
powers of management and its characterization of all of the elements of the offense, including that of 
intention on the part of the harasser). 
See also Françoise Champeaux, Les mutations du harcèlement moral, 1482 SEMAINE SOCIALE LAMY 2 
(2011) (discussing the duality of the penal law and the labor law of moral harassment with respect to 
the issue of intention, noting that the offense of harassment is an intentional offense, « un délit 
intentionnel, » with intent to commit the act of harassment being an element of the infraction); Fortis, 
supra note 85 (discussing duality of definition of moral harassment in the Labor Code and the Penal 
Code, given that Court of Cassation held that moral harassment can exist independent of the 
intention of the harasser, while the Penal Code retains as an element of moral harassment the 
existence of intentional or reckless conduct). 
 97.  Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] crim., Dec. 6, 2011, Bull. crim., 
No. 249, No. 10-82266, available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do 
?oldAction=rechJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEXT000025119012&fastReqId=25775373&fastPos=1 
(reversing decision of court of appeals that a subordinate’s action of sending obscene e-mails to his 
female supervisor and engaging in other disruptive behavior, ultimately resulting in her suicide, 
could not constitute moral harassment without a showing of actual degradation of working 
conditions or compromise of her professional future and because he was her subordinate; court of 
cassation held that conduct must only be likely to have those effects to be actionable and that the fact 
that he was her subordinate was irrelevant to the establishment of the offense). 
 98.  Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] soc., May 26, 2010, Bull. civ. V, 
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the Court of Cassation did confirm that a single act is not sufficient to establish 
the existence of moral harassment, because the statutory language expressly 
requires that actions be repeated.99 
The social division of the Court of Cassation upheld the decision of the 
court of appeals to find the existence of moral harassment when a supervisor 
imposed on his subordinate constant pressure for him to quit his job and 
constant reproaches, and refused to communicate and give instructions for his 
work.100 Similarly, the social division of the Court of Cassation rejected the 
conclusion of the court of appeals that moral harassment had not been shown by 
a subordinate’s claim that his supervisor was constantly on his back and 
controlled completely his starting and stopping work, refusing even to provide 
him time to go to the toilet and to wash his hands, on the grounds that he had 
not shown that the deterioration of his health was related to his working 
conditions; the Court of Cassation indicated that once the employee established 
facts from which the existence of moral harassment could be presumed, it was 
the employer’s burden to establish the lack of moral harassment.101 
Similarly, the social division of the Court of Cassation rejected the decision 
of the court of appeals that moral harassment had not been established in the 
case of an employee who was made to work seven days a week for nearly two 
years, sometimes for as long as twenty-one hours at a time, and was sent as 
many as thirty-three e-mails a day urging her to increase her rate of work, on the 
grounds that the court of appeals had not justified its decision by merely stating 
that the acts “in themselves” did not constitute moral harassment.102 
The criminal division of the Court of Cassation confirmed the court of 
appeals’ decision to convict operators of a supermarket of moral harassment 
 
No. 111, No. 08-43152, available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do 
?oldAction=rechJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEXT000022279684&fastReqId=63530855&fastPos=2. 
 99.  Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] soc., Dec. 9, 2009, Bull. civ. V, 
No. 280, No. 07-45521, available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do 
?oldAction=rechJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEXT000021472025 (ruling that single act of demotion of 
employee from business representative to secretary could not constitute moral harassment because 
statutory requirement of repeated acts was not satisfied). 
 100.  Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] soc., Nov. 10, 2009, Bull. civ. V, 
No. 247, No. 07-45321, available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction 
=rechJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEXT000021270312&fastReqId=85430940&fastPos=1. 
 101.  Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] soc., Apr. 30, 2009, Bull. soc. V, 
No. 120, No. 07-43219, available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do 
?oldAction=rechJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEXT000020577017&fastReqId=84221230&fastPos=1. This 
allocation of the burden of proof is dictated by statute. Article L. 1154-1 of the Labor Code requires 
that the employee complaining of harassment establish facts from which the existence of harassment 
can be presumed and that the party defending against the claim prove that those facts do not 
constitute moral harassment and that the employer’s actions were justified by objective factors 
unrelated to any harassment.  CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] art. L. 1154-1 (In the original French: «le 
salarié établit des faits qui permettent de présumer l’existence d’un harcèlement » and « [a]u vu de 
ces éléments, il incombe à la partie défenderesse de prouver que ces agissements ne sont pas 
constitutifs d’un tel harcèlement et que sa décision est justifiée par des éléments objectifs étrangers à 
tout harcèlement »). 
 102.  Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] soc., Sept. 22, 2010, No. 09-
41.495.http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction=rechJuriJudi&idTexte 
=JURITEXT000022858175&fastReqId=1882335558&fastPos=1. 
Hebert Proof 1 (Do Not Delete) 2/18/2014  11:31 AM 
28 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 21:1 2013 
based on their actions toward a number of employees, including whistling to call 
employees, demeaning and criticizing them in front of customers, accusing one 
employee of maintaining a sexual relationship with a store manager and another 
of being an alcoholic, and isolating employees from each other.103 
The provisions on moral harassment in the Penal and Labor Codes share 
with the corresponding sexual harassment provisions the concept of the violation 
of the dignity of the employee subjected to harassment, but contain additional 
concepts not shared by the definition of sexual harassment. The moral 
harassment provisions focus on the somewhat more tangible harms of 
deterioration of working conditions, harm to an employee’s mental and physical 
health, and injury to one’s professional future, while the sexual harassment 
provisions focus on degrading and humiliating conduct and the creation of an 
intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment. Accordingly, while the 
underlying basis of the sexual harassment provisions seems to be focused on 
preventing harm to dignity, the underlying basis of the moral harassment 
provisions appears to be an interest in protecting an employee from unfavorable 
workplace conditions and preserving his or her employment opportunities. 
C. The Prohibition of Discriminatory Harassment 
A third prohibition on harassment is found in the Labor Code in Article L. 
1132-1, prohibiting harassment as a form of discrimination. That provision 
generally prohibits an individual, in the context of employment, from being 
subjected to “discriminatory measures. . . by reason of . . . his or sex” or other 
protected characteristics, including age, sexual orientation or gender identity, 
ethnicity, religious beliefs, or disability, among others.104 Discrimination is 
expressly defined in that article to include discrimination as defined in the law of 
May 27, 2008, which adapted certain European Union Directives concerning 
discrimination into French national law.105 In particular, discrimination is 
defined in that law to include: “[a]ny act linked to one of the motives mentioned 
in the first paragraph and any act with a sexual connotation, suffered by a person 
and having the purpose or the effect of violating his or her dignity or creating an 
intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment.”106 
 
 103.  Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] crim., May 26, 2009, No. 08-
87.874,  http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction=rechJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEX 
T000020767462&fastReqId=816875523&fastPos=1 (denying the store operators relief on the first 
grounds for appeal). 
 104.  CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] art. L. 1132-1 (In the original French : « aucune salarié . . . ne 
faire l’objet d’une mesure discriminatoire . . . en raison . . . de son origine, de son sexe, de ses mœurs, 
de son orientation ou identité sexuelle, de son âge, de sa situation de famille ou de sa grossesse, de 
ses caractéristiques génétiques, de son appartenance ou de sa non-appartenance, vraie ou supposée, à 
une ethnie, une nation ou une race, de ses opinions politiques, de ses activités syndicales ou 
mutualistes, de ses convictions religieuses, de son apparence physique, de son nom de famille ou en 
raison de son état de santé ou de son handicap. »). 
 105.  Loi 2008-496 du 27 mai 2008 portant diverses dispositions d’adaptation au droit 
communautaire dans le domaine de la lutte contre les discriminations [English translation], JOURNAL 
OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], May 27, 2008. 
 106.  Id. (In the original French: « Tout agissement lié à l’un des motifs mentionnés au premier 
alinéa et tout agissement à connotation sexuelle, subis par une personne et ayant pour objet ou pour 
effet de porter atteinte à sa dignité ou de créer un environnement hostile, dégradant, humiliant ou 
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As with the provisions on sexual and moral harassment, the Labor Code 
contains other provisions with respect to discriminatory harassment. Employees 
may not be discriminated against or subject to adverse action in connection with 
employment for having testified about or reported acts of discrimination.107 
However, the Labor Code provisions on discriminatory harassment do not 
include a provision imposing on employers the obligation to take action to 
prevent acts of discrimination or discriminatory harassment, as is imposed on 
employers with respect to sexual and moral harassment. 
The European Union directives incorporated into French national law 
include Directive 2006/54/EC, which makes clear that harassment, including 
sexual harassment, is a form of discrimination.108 That directive defines 
“harassment” as existing “where unwanted conduct related to the sex of a person 
occurs with the purpose or effect of violating the dignity of a person, and of 
creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive 
environment.”109 “Sexual harassment” is defined in that directive as existing 
“where any form of unwanted verbal, non-verbal or physical conduct of a sexual 
nature occurs, with the purpose or effect of violating the dignity of a person, in 
particular when creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or 
offensive environment.”110 Accordingly, the more general term “harassment” 
would seem to encompass non-sexual conduct motivated by or related to an 
individual’s sex or gender, while the narrower term of “sexual harassment” 
would seem to be limited to conduct with a sexual connotation, but without any 
express requirement that the conduct be shown to have been motivated by or be 
related to a person’s sex or gender. 
Other European Union directives dealing with discrimination that were also 
incorporated into French national law by the law of May 27, 2008 specify that 
acts motivated by or linked to other protected characteristics also constitute 
 
offensant »).  The French Penal Code also contains a prohibition on acts of discrimination, but that 
provision does not contain a definition of or prohibition on discriminatory harassment.  That 
provision defines as discrimination any distinction between individuals because of their sex or other 
characteristics, including origin, ethnicity, religious beliefs, disability, or sexual orientation or gender 
identity, as well as others. In the original French: « Constitue une discrimination toute distinction 
opérée entre les personnes physiques à raison de leur origine, de leur sexe, de leur situation de 
famille, de leur grossesse, de leur apparence physique, de leur patronyme, de leur état de santé, de 
leur handicap, de leurs caractéristiques génétiques, de leurs moeurs, de leur orientation ou identité 
sexuelle, de leur âge, de leurs opinions politiques, de leurs activités syndicales, de leur appartenance 
ou de leur non-appartenance, vraie ou supposée, à une ethnie, une nation, une race ou une religion 
déterminée.» CODE PENAL [C. PEN.] art. 225-1. 
 107.  CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] art. L. 1132-3 (“No employee may be sanctioned, dismissed, or 
subjected to discriminatory measures for having testified of acts defined in articles L. 1132-1 and L. 
1132-2 or for having reported them.”). In the original French : « Aucun salarié ne peut être 
sanctionné, licencié ou faire l’objet d’une mesure discriminatoire pour avoir témoigné des 
agissements définis aux articles L. 1132-1 et L. 1132-2 ou pour les avoir relatés. » 
 108.  Directive 2006/54/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the 
implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in 
matters of employment and occupation, 2006 O.J. (L 204) 23.  That directive provides that 
“[h]arassment and sexual harassment are contrary to the principle of equal treatment between men 
and women and constitute discrimination on grounds of sex for the purposes of this Directive.” 
 109.  Id. at 26. 
 110.  Id. at 27. 
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harassment and therefore discrimination. Council Directive 2000/43/EC of June 
29, 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons 
irrespective of racial or ethnic origin defines harassment as a form of 
discrimination that occurs “when an unwanted conduct related to racial or ethnic 
origin takes place with the purpose or effect of violating the dignity of a person 
and of creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive 
environment.”111 Similarly, Council Directive 2000/78/EC of November 27, 2000, 
establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and 
occupation, defines harassment as a form of discrimination on the basis of 
religion or belief, disability, age, or sexual orientation “when unwanted conduct 
related to any of the grounds . . . takes place with the purpose or effect of 
violating the dignity of a person and of creating an intimidating, hostile, 
degrading, humiliating or offensive environment.”112 
The European Union directives and their approach of defining harassment 
as a form of discrimination appears to have been heavily influenced by Anglo-
Saxon approaches to harassment law, including the law of the United States. It is 
impossible to miss the similarity in language between the U.S. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission’s definition of what is known as “hostile 
environment” sexual harassment and the definition of harassment contained in 
the European Directives. The regulations of the EEOC define “sexual 
harassment” as including “[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual 
favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual 
harassment when . . . such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably 
interfering with an individual’s work performance or creating an intimidating, 
hostile or offensive working environment.”113 While there are obviously 
important differences between those definitions, most importantly the inclusion 
in the European Directives of the notion of violation of dignity, it seems clear that 
the European Directives were modeled at least in part on U.S. law.114 
The Labor Code’s definition of discriminatory harassment appears to create 
a two-pronged definition of harassment. First, harassment is defined as acts 
linked or related to one of the various discriminatory motives prohibited by the 
law, including discrimination on the basis of sex. Accordingly, acts that are 
 
 111.  Council Directive 2000/43/EC, of 29 June 2000 Implementing the Principle of Equal 
Treatment between Persons Irrespective of Racial or Ethnic Origin, art. 2, 2000 O.J. (L 180) 22, 24. 
 112.  Council Directive 2000/78/EC, of 27 November 2000 Establishing a General Framework for 
Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation, arts. 1, 2, 2000 O.J. (L 303) 16, 18-19. 
 113.  29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (2012). 
 114.  In connection with the enactment of the new sexual harassment law in France, legislators 
recognized this similarity and expressed apparent discomfort that the European Union directives 
were being used as a model for that new law, indicating the inconsistency between those directives 
equating sexual harassment with discrimination, while French law generally does not. See Sénat, 
Session Extraordinaire de 2011-2012, Séance du mercredi 11 juillet 2012, Compte rendu intégral, 
JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAIS [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 12, 2012, p. 
2032 (statement of Mme Éliane Assassi) (noting that the United States’ approach to sexual harassment 
as a form of discrimination has echos in Europe and resulted in the text of the directives/ In French, 
« Dans le pays anglo-saxons, notamment aux États-Unis, les actes de « harcèlement sexuel » ont 
toujours été appréhendés sous l’angle de la « discrimination sexuelle ». Cette approche du 
harcèlement comme forme de discrimination fondée sur le sexe, a eu des échos en Europe et s’est 
traduite dans le texte de la directive. »). 
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motivated by a prohibited basis and that violate a person’s dignity or create a 
hostile or offensive environment constitute prohibited harassment, regardless of 
whether those acts have a sexual connotation. In addition, however, all acts that 
have a sexual connotation, apparently regardless of whether they are proven to 
be linked to the prohibited motive of sex, are defined as harassment, as long as 
they have the purpose or effect of violating the person’s dignity or creating a 
hostile or offensive environment. It is not clear whether the decision to define 
acts with a sexual connotation as discriminatory harassment under this 
provision, without an explicit showing of the motivation behind that harassment, 
represents an intent not to require evidence of discrimination for these types of 
harassment claims or merely a belief that acts with a sexual connotation are 
necessarily linked or related to a prohibited motivation, that of sex or gender. 
The Labor Code provision on discriminatory harassment would seem to 
reach much, but not all, of the same conduct that is encompassed within the 
definitions of sexual and moral harassment contained in the other portions of the 
Penal Code and Labor Code addressed above, while some conduct would seem 
to violate this provision but would not be covered under those other definitions. 
Accordingly, this provision seems to be, at the same time, both broader and 
narrower in scope than the other definitions of sexual and moral harassment. 
This provision is narrower in the sense that, at least with respect to harassment 
that does not consist of conduct with a sexual connotation or of a sexual nature, 
the harassing conduct must be shown to have been motivated by one of the listed 
grounds of discrimination in order to be actionable under this provision. 
Accordingly, acts of moral harassment will presumably fall within the scope of 
the provision on discriminatory harassment only when they are motivated by 
one of the grounds of discrimination prohibited by the Labor Code. 
At the same time, while the other definitions of moral harassment explicitly 
require repeated actions, and the other definitions of sexual harassment require 
repeated actions when the conduct is not directed at obtaining sexual conduct, 
the definition of discriminatory harassment does not expressly require that 
actions be repeated, to the extent that a single act might be sufficient to violate 
one’s dignity or create a hostile or offensive environment. Accordingly, this 
provision would seem to cover some instances of both sexual and moral 
harassment based on a single, very serious, but not repeated, act considered 
sufficient to violate the dignity of an individual or otherwise adversely affect his 
or her workplace conditions or environment. 
There have been few, if any, cases concerning harassment decided under 
this definition of harassment in the Labor Code. The definition of discriminatory 
harassment was adopted into French national law at the insistence of the 
European Union and it appears not to have been embraced by either litigants or 
the courts. It seems likely that this is the case because of the separation in French 
law generally between harassment and discrimination. 
III. USE OF FRENCH HARASSMENT LAW AS A MODEL FOR A CLAIM OF HARASSMENT 
UNDER UNITED STATES LAW 
There is a certain irony in looking to French harassment law as a potential 
model for a gender-neutral claim of harassment in the United States. First, as 
explained above, the new definition of sexual harassment in France was inspired 
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in part by the European Directives on harassment, which were in turn inspired 
by Anglo-Saxon notions of harassment, including those of the United States. 
Accordingly, in some sense, the United States would be looking for inspiration 
from a legal concept inspired in part by its own legal system. On the other hand, 
the European Union directives, and France, in turn, have introduced a new 
concept into its harassment law, that of “dignity,” which the United States’ 
approach has not encompassed. 
A second source of irony in using French harassment law as a model for a 
claim of harassment in the United States is that legislators and others in France 
have often expressed concern that French sexual harassment law not reflect the 
perceived “excesses” of the United States’ sexual harassment law.115 Accordingly, 
looking to French law to expand upon the concept of sexual harassment in the 
United States might well strike the French as an inappropriate use of their law. 
Finally, looking to French law as a potential model for a claim of 
harassment within the United States will also require overcoming a similar 
resistance on the part of some lawmakers in the United States. Some legislators 
and members of the judiciary in the United States have shown a resistance to 
looking to foreign law to inform their understanding of law in the United 
States.116 This resistance seems to be wrongheaded and provincial; to paraphrase 
United States Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer, it seems that the worst that 
can happen is that nations, courts, and legislatures “might learn something”117 
from each other. 
What the United States might learn from France is that a focus on the 
 
 115.  See ABIGAIL C. SAGUY, WHAT IS SEXUAL HARASSMENT? FROM CAPITOL HILL TO THE SORBONNE 
16, 38 (2003) (discussing the way the French press has trivialized sexual harassment by focusing on 
American “excesses” and “puritanism,” and how proponents of the original sexual harassment 
legislation in France encountered resistance among legislators “who seemed intent on discrediting 
the bill by appealing to anti-American rhetoric, arguing that passing a sexual harassment law in 
France would have the undesirable effect of importing ‘American excesses’ of litigiousness, 
puritanism, and the Battle of the Sexes”). See also Assemblée Nationale, Session Extraordinaire de 
2011-2012, Séances du mardi 24 juillet 2012, Compte rendu intégrale, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA 
REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAIS [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 25, 2012, p. 2407 (statement of M. 
Georges Fenech) (without directly invoking the name of the United States, he expressed the concern 
with using language from the European directives on hostile and offensive environments because it 
“comes from a culture marked by moral strictness and puritanism”/ In French: «Certes, cette 
terminologie est issue d’une directive européenne mais l’on peut se demander, j’ose le dire, si elle 
n’est pas surtout issue d’une culture marquée par le rigorisme et le puritanisme. »). 
 116.  See Martha Minow, The Controversial Status of International and Comparative Law in the United 
States, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. Online 1, 2-3 (2010), 
http://www.harvardilj.org/2010/08/online_52_minow/ (describing controversy over reference of 
the law of other nations as recent, with a reference to the need to consult the law of other nations 
found in the Federalist Papers and frequent citations to the law of other nations in early decisions of 
the United States Supreme Court).  The recency of the controversy, however, has not affected the 
ferocity of the opposition to references to foreign law; some members of Congress have suggested 
that judges who cite to foreign law should be impeached.  Id. at 4. 
 117.  Id. at 5 (citing Jesse J. Holland, Justice Breyer Says Debate Over Foreign Law is Irrelevant, 
LAW.COM, (Apr. 2, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/scm/PrintFriendly.jsp?id=1202447364424).  
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has also challenged the notion that the United States should not seek to 
learn from the law of other countries: “We are the losers if we neglect what others can tell us about 
endeavors to eradicate bias against women, minorities, and other disadvantaged groups.” Justice 
Stephen Breyer, Keynote Address, 97 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 265 (2003) (quoting Ginsburg, J.). 
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discriminatory aspects of sexual harassment—the ways in which sexual 
harassment is spawned in part by the existence of gender inequality in the 
workplace, as well as the ways in which the existence of sexual harassment in the 
workplace creates more gender inequality—is not the only way to approach 
issues of sexual harassment. While sexual harassment raises issues of gender 
equality, it also raises issues of basic respect for human dignity and autonomy. 
To the extent that those issues of human dignity and autonomy are not directly 
tied to gender—that women (and men) who are sexually harassed suffer harm to 
their dignity and autonomy not because they are women (or men) but because 
they are human—a consideration of harms to dignity, separate from a focus on 
considerations of gender equality, might well provide an independent ground 
for condemning sexual harassment. 
To understand whether this is true, it is necessary to understand what is 
meant by “dignity” as used in the French laws of sexual and moral harassment. 
To make this determination, one might look to a number of sources, including 
how that term is used in other legal and similar documents in France and within 
European Union nations more generally, as well as the commonly understood 
meaning of that term, both in France and elsewhere. 
As the term “dignity” is used more generally, the concept of dignity may 
not be as much a single concept as a number of related concepts.118 One meaning 
given to dignity seems tied to notions of equality, such that each individual is 
entitled to the equal dignity as every other individual.119 This concept of dignity 
is reflected in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which indicates in 
Article 1 that: “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and 
rights.”120 Under this meaning of the term “dignity,” discrimination itself would 
violate dignity, by denying individuals their entitlement to equal respect for their 
dignity and rights. 
Another meaning given to the concept of dignity is that of autonomy or self-
determination, such that individuals have the right to make their own decisions 
about how to live their lives.121 Still another meaning of the concept of dignity is 
the notion of dignity as meriting respect for one’s person. This is a common 
meaning given to the concept of dignity, such that humiliation or degradation 
counts as a violation of human dignity.122 
The concept of “dignity” is recognized in the European Union Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, in Article 1 of Chapter 1 of that document: “Human dignity 
 
 118.  The right to dignity can also be understood, and is understood in some countries, as a 
positive right that provides citizens with a right to a certain level of subsistence consistent with 
notions of human dignity. See ERIN DALY, DIGNITY RIGHTS: COURTS, CONSTITUTIONS, AND THE WORTH 
OF THE HUMAN PERSON 54-70 (2013) (discussing the theory of “material dignity” and its role in the 
constitutions and jurisprudence of various nations). This, however, does not appear to the way in 
which the term “dignity” is used within the new French harassment provisions. 
 119.  See id. at 34-35 (detailing the “equality” theory of dignity). 
 120.  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 1, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). 
 121.  See DALY, supra note 125, at 38-44 (linking autonomy to “full personality development”). 
 122.  See MICHAEL ROSEN, DIGNITY: ITS HISTORY AND MEANING 127 (2012) (“[T]he idea that 
humiliation or degradation counts as a violation of human dignity has a very good claim to be 
universal even though the practices by which that may be expressed vary.”). 
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is inviolable. It must be respected and protected.”123 The Commentary of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union refers to dignity as a 
foundational value and indicates that the term “human dignity” in the Charter is 
a legal term. The Commentary notes certain definitions given to the term 
“human dignity” in case law within the European Union, including the 
following definition by the German Federal Constitutional Court: “The term 
‘human dignity’ means that the human being has a right to ‘social value and 
respect.’”124 The Commentary declares that: “Any measure impairs Article 1 if it 
brings into contempt the value which a human being has by his/her being a 
person. Measures of this kind would be humiliation, branding, outlawing or 
other behaviour which deprives the human person of the right to recognition as a 
human being.”125 Accordingly, it appears that the concept of dignity, as used 
within the European Union generally, encompasses at least the concept of 
dignity as respect and freedom from humiliating or degrading conduct. 
The dictionary definition of the French word « dignité » is « respect que 
mérite quelqu’un » (in English, “respect that is deserved by someone”),126 as well 
as « respect de soi » (in English, “self respect”).127 It appears that the common 
meaning of dignity in the French language includes at least the concept of 
dignity as respect and freedom from humiliation. 
The term “dignity” does not appear in the current French Constitution, that 
of October 4, 1958, although the Constitution does refer to other rights 
considered to be basic, such as liberty, equality, and fraternity.128 The concept of 
 
 123.  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 2000/C 364/01, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1, 9. 
As originally enacted, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union had no formal legal 
status under European Union law, the European Commission indicated that it would treat the 
Charter as if it were binding and the European Parliament indicated that it would pay particular 
attention to whether proposed legislation was in conformity with the Charter. European Union 
Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights, Commentary of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union 15 (June 2006), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-
rights/files/networkcommentaryfinal_en.pdf. However, with the entry into force of the Treaty of 
Lisbon, the Charter became legally binding on the E.U. itself and its member nations. Treaty of 
Lisbon, Official Journal of the European Union, c. 306, vol. 50 (Dec. 17, 2007). 
 124.  European Union Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights, Commentary of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 26 (June 2006) (citing Sammlung der 
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] [Reports of the Decisions of the Federal 
Constitutional Court], Oct. 20, 1992, 87, 209.)). 
 125.   Id. at 28. 
 126. PAUL ROBERT, LE PETIT ROBERT, DICTIONNAIRE ALPHABETIQUE ET ANALOGIQUE DE LA LANGUE 
FRANÇAISE 482 (1967). One example given in the dictionary for this meaning is « principe de la 
dignité de la personne humaine » (in English, principle of the dignity of the human person). 
 127.  Id.  One of the examples of this meaning is « manquer de dignité » (In English, “lack of 
dignity”). 
 128.  1958 CONST. Preamble (Fr.), available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-
constitutionnel/english/constitution/constitution-of-4-october-1958.25742.html (English version) 
[hereinafter 1958 Constitution]. The Preamble to the 1958 Constitution declares that: “The French 
people solemnly proclaim their attachment to the Rights of Man and the principles of national 
sovereignty as defined by the Declaration of 1789, confirmed and complemented by the Preamble to 
the Constitution of 1946, and to the rights and duties as defined in the Charter for the Environment of 
2004.”  Dignity is also not mentioned in the Preamble to the Constitution of 27 October 1946. 1946 
CONST. Preamble (Fr.), available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-
constitutionnel/francais/la-constitution/les-constitutions-de-la-france/constitution-de-1946-ive-
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dignity, however, has been incorporated into French law, including into the 
Penal Code. In addition to the use of the French word « dignité » in the Penal 
Code provisions on sexual and moral harassment, the Penal Code also contains a 
chapter titled “Attacks on the dignity of the person” (In French, « Des atteintes à 
la dignité de la personne »),129 which includes a prohibition on discrimination, 
including a prohibition on discrimination against a person who submits or 
refuses to submit to sexual harassment.130 Also included within this chapter is a 
prohibition on human trafficking,131 a prohibition on forcing another to conceal 
his or her face by reason of sex,132 a prohibition on the promotion of 
prostitution,133 a prohibition on the exploitation of begging,134 and a prohibition 
on hazing.135 
It would appear that the concept of dignity within French law includes 
notions of equality of treatment, as reflected in the prohibitions of different forms 
of discrimination, as well as the notion of respect or freedom from humiliating 
and degrading behavior, as reflected in the prohibitions of human trafficking, the 
promotion or exploitation of prostitution and begging, and hazing. The 
prohibition of hazing makes specific reference to humiliating and degrading acts. 
It is also possible that the prohibition of human trafficking and on forcing 
another to conceal his or her face by reason of sex is also aimed at the notion of 
dignity as autonomy. 
The concept of dignity as respect and freedom from humiliating and 
degrading behavior seems to be the meaning of “dignity” that has been 
incorporated into the new French sexual harassment provisions, which prohibit 
 
republique.5109.html  The term “dignités » is found in the French version of the Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and the Citizen of August 26, 1789, in Article VI, which declares that « Tous les 
citoyens étant égaux à ses yeux, sont également admissibles à toutes dignités, places et emplois 
publics, selon leur capacité, et sans autre distinction que celle de leurs vertus et de leurs talents. ».  
Déclaration des Droits de L’Homme et du Citoyen de 1789, available at http://www.assemblee-
nationale.fr/histoire/dudh/1789.asp [hereinafter French Declaration].  However, in the English 
version of the Declaration, made available on the website of the Conseil Constitutionelle 
(Constitutional Council), that portion of the Declaration is translated as: “All citizens, being equal in 
its eyes, shall be equally eligible to all high offices, public positions and employments, according to 
their ability, and without other distinction than that of their virtues and talents.” Déclaration des 
Droits de L’Homme et du Citoyen de 1789, available at http://www.conseil-
constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/root/bank_mm/anglais/cst2.pdf (English version).  See 
also ROBERT, supra note 133 (defining «dignité » as « fonction, titre or charge qui donne à quelqu’un 
un rang eminent » /duties, title, or responsibility that gives someone a high rank).  Accordingly, it 
does not appear that the Declaration refers to human dignity. By contrast, in the first and second 
articles of the Declaration, reference is made to principles of equality and liberty.  French Declaration, 
arts. 2-3. 
 129.  See generally CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN] (Chapter V, titled “Attacks on the Dignity of the Person,” 
is found within Title II, titled “Attacks on the Human Person” (in French, « Titre II : Des atteintes à la 
personne humaine »)). This is found within Book II, “Crimes and misdemeanors against persons” (In 
French, « Livre II : Des crimes et délits contre les personnes »). 
 130.  Id. arts. 225-1 to 225-4.  The prohibition on discrimination against a person who submits to 
or refuses to submit to sexual harassment is found in CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN] art. 225-1-1. 
 131.  Id. arts. 225-4-1 to 225-4-9. 
 132.  Id. art. 225-4-10. 
 133.  Id. arts. 225-5 to 225-12. 
 134.  Id. arts. 225-12-5 to 225-12-7. 
 135.  Id. arts. 225-16-1 to 226-16-3. 
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the use of words or behavior with a sexual connotation against an individual, 
“which undermine his or her dignity by reason of their degrading or humiliating 
nature.”136 
The concept of dignity, while not foreign to the law of the United States, has 
not played the central role in U.S. law occupied by other foundational concepts. 
The Declaration of Independence by the thirteen united States of America refers 
to equality, liberty, and happiness, but not to “dignity”—at least not directly.137 
The word “dignity” is also not found in the Constitution of the United States.138 
This is not really surprising, because the concept of dignity as a foundational 
human right is relatively modern, dating from the late 1940s, after World War 
II.139 
On the other hand, courts in the United States, including the United States 
Supreme Court, have invoked the concept of human dignity in determining the 
proper application of constitutional provisions. This reliance on the concept of 
dignity seems to correspond to the broader global focus on dignity as a 
foundational human right, following World War II.140 During the latter half of 
the 20th century and the first decade or so of the 21st century, the United States 
Supreme Court began to recognize that dignity was implicated in a number of 
contexts, including issues of discrimination, privacy, and speech.141 
An analysis of the manner in which Supreme Court justices have invoked 
the concept of dignity suggests that they have understood dignity as involving 
all three of the potential definitions of the term “dignity” described above: 
equality, autonomy, and respect. In some cases, equality has appeared to be the 
focus of the Court’s discussion of dignity, while in other cases, the members of 
the Court seemed to focus more on issues of autonomy or respect. 
For example, the Court in Lawrence v. Texas, in an opinion written by Justice 
Kennedy striking down a state statute criminalizing certain same-sex sexual 
conduct, seemed to focus more on the notion of dignity as equality when it noted 
that criminalization of such conduct even as a low-level misdemeanor, 
particularly when similar sexual conduct between members of the opposite sex 
was not prohibited, harmed the dignity of those so charged and convicted.142 The 
focus on dignity as equality is even more clear in the case of J.E.B. v. Alabama,143 
in which then Justice Blackman wrote an opinion on behalf of the Court holding 
 
 136.  Id. art. 222-33-I ; CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV] art. L. 1153-1 (In French, « qui soit portant 
atteinte à sa dignité en raison de leur caractère déradant ou humiliant »). 
 137.  THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 138.  U.S. CONST. 
 139.  See ROSEN, supra note 129, at 2 (noting that dignity played a “vital role” in important 
documents from the 1940s, including the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights); see also DALY, 
supra note 125, at 1  (“Until the late twentieth century, there was no right to dignity. . .All that 
changed in the aftermath of the Second World War.”). 
 140.  See generally DALY, supra note 125, at 82-100 (describing the beginnings of the use of the 
concept of dignity in opinions of the United States Supreme Court, in the wake of World War II). 
 141.  Id. at 90-96. 
 142.  See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003) (“Equality of treatment and the due process 
right to demand respect for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in 
important respects, and a decision on the latter point advances both interests.”). 
 143.  511 U.S. 127 (1994). 
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that the use of peremptory challenges to exclude men from a jury considering a 
paternity child support action violated the Equal Protection Clause because 
striking male jurors simply because of their gender “denigrates the dignity of the 
excluded juror.”144 
In other cases, however, dignity as autonomy or as respect seems more the 
focus of the Court’s analysis. Indeed, the cases suggest that not all the justices of 
the Court perceive “dignity” to have the same meaning or at least the same 
meaning in the same cases. In Indiana v. Edwards,145 involving the claim of a 
mentally ill criminal defendant who had been denied the right of self-
representation in his criminal trial, both the majority opinion by Justice Breyer 
and the dissent by Justice Scalia invoked the concept of dignity in support of 
their respective, and opposite, positions on the legal issue. Justice Breyer for the 
Court indicated that although interests in dignity and autonomy are the basis of 
the right of self-representation, allowing a defendant who lacks the mental 
capacity to conduct his own defense will not “affirm [his] dignity” because “the 
spectacle that could well result from his self-representation at trial is at least as 
likely to prove humiliating as ennobling.”146 Accordingly, while the majority of 
the Court seemed to define dignity, at least in part, as freedom from humiliation, 
Justice Scalia argued that the relevant issue of dignity underlying the right of 
self-representation was instead autonomy. He indicated that the “loss of ‘dignity’ 
the right is designed to prevent is not the defendant’s making a fool of himself by 
presenting an amateurish or even incoherent defense,” but was instead “the 
supreme human dignity of being master of one’s fate rather than a ward of the 
State—the dignity of individual choice.”147 However, even Justice Scalia, in his 
dissenting opinion in the case of National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,148 
dealing with the constitutionality of a program of drug testing in federal 
employment, seemed to define the concept of dignity in terms of freedom from 
humiliation. He called the program of drug testing, which required monitoring 
of the process of urination, to be “particularly destructive of privacy and 
offensive to personal dignity.”149 And he argued that not only these employees 
but the entire society would suffer from this “affront to . . . dignity”: 
Those who lose because of the lack of understanding that begot the present 
exercise in symbolism are not just the Customs Service employees, whose dignity 
is thus offended, but all of us—who suffer a coarsening of our national manners 
that ultimately give the Fourth Amendment its content, and who become subject 
to the administration of federal officials whose respect for our privacy can hardly 
be greater than the small respect they have been taught to have for their own.150 
Accordingly, an incorporation of the concept of dignity into the law of 
sexual harassment would not seem to be inconsistent with the values recognized 
by American courts, particularly with respect to the notion of dignity as the right 
 
 144.  Id. at 142. 
 145.  554 U.S. 164 (2008). 
 146.  Id. at 176. 
 147.  Id. at 186-87 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
 148.  489 U.S. 656 (1989). 
 149.  Id. at 680 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 150.  Id. at 687. 
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to be free from certain forms of disrespectful, humiliating, and degrading 
conduct. While the concept of dignity has generally been recognized by the 
courts in connection with their interpretation of constitutional provisions, there 
is no reason that protection for dignity could not be incorporated into statutory 
protections against sexual harassment, as the notion of equality has been 
incorporated into statutory protections. 
A number of lower courts151 have recognized that sexual harassment can 
implicate the dignity interests of the individuals subjected to sexual harassment 
in a number of different contexts. The federal judge in Gallagher v. Delaney,152 
interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, noted that the prohibition 
against workplace sexual harassment was based at least in part on considerations 
of dignity: 
[N]o principled argument supports the view that sex-based offensive behavior in 
the workplace is immune from remedy simply because it may be culturally 
tolerated outside of the workplace. The purpose of Title VII is not to import into 
the workplace the prejudices of the community, but through law to liberate the 
workplace from the  demeaning influence of discrimination, and thereby to 
implement the goal of human dignity and economic equality in employment.153 
Similarly, a federal bankruptcy judge agreed that a judgment of sexual 
harassment against a former employer was not dischargeable in bankruptcy 
because the injury was malicious: “Sexual harassment is not only illegal, but so 
morally reprehensible and degrading to one’s personal dignity that the harasser’s 
conduct cannot possibly be considered anything other than ‘wrongful and 
without just cause or excuse.’”154 In the context of a state court judge being 
disciplined for his sexually harassing behavior toward his law clerk, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court indicated that the conduct was “personally offensive to his 
employee and inimical to her dignity, privacy, and emotional well-being.”155 
In the context of a claim by a male prison inmate of sexual harassment by a 
female prison guard with whom he had had a prior romantic but not sexual 
relationship, the federal appeals court judge reversed the trial court’s grant of 
summary judgment against the inmate on his Eighth Amendment claim; the 
 
 151.  Even the United States Supreme Court seems to have recognized a connection between 
sexual harassment and dignity, although the precise nature of that connection is not altogether clear 
from the language of the case.  See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 77 (1998).  
In a case involving claims of same-sex sexual harassment in which the male plaintiff had alleged that 
he was threatened with rape and had a bar of soap shoved up his rectum by his male supervisors and 
co-workers, Justice Scalia on behalf of the Court noted that “in the interest of both brevity and 
dignity” the facts would be described only generally.  Id.  It is not entirely clear, however, whether 
Justice Scalia was concerned with Joseph Oncale’s dignity or the dignity of the Court.  Justice Scalia, 
however, did note that Oncale had been subjected to “sex-related, humiliating actions.”  Id. 
 152.  139 F.3d 338 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 153.  Id. at 342 (citing King v. Hillen, 21 F.3d 1572, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). See also Leibovitz v. New 
York City Transit Authority, 4 F. Supp. 2d 144, 152 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (in context of Title VII hostile 
environment sexual harassment claim by a woman who had not been personally harassed, the court 
noted that an environment in which a superior refers to women in vulgar sexual terms “is 
demeaning, harassing, and incompatible with the dignity and well-being of all the women in that 
workplace”). 
 154.  In re Walter Spagnola, 473 B.R. 518, 524 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 155.  In the matter of Judge Edward Seaman, 627 A.2d 106, 115 (N.J. 1993). 
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court of appeals held sufficient his allegations that the female guard had touched 
his groin and reached into his gym shorts to stroke his penis, noting that the 
sexual assault on an inmate by a prison guard is “‘offensive to human 
dignity.’”156 
State legislatures enacting prohibitions against sexual harassment have also 
drawn the connection between sexual harassment and dignity. The Tennessee 
Human Rights Act, which prohibits sexual harassment in the context of the 
workplace, includes within its purposes not only to prohibit discrimination on 
the basis of sex and other characteristics, but to “[p]rotect [individuals’] interest 
in personal dignity and freedom from humiliation.”157 Similarly, the Puerto Rico 
statute prohibiting sexual harassment in the context of employment declares that 
it is the public policy of Puerto Rico that “sexual harassment in employment is a 
type of sexual discrimination and, as such, constitutes an illegal and undesirable 
practice that goes against the established constitutional principle that the dignity 
of a human being is inviolable.”158 
Sexual harassment implicates notions of equality, and therefore might be 
viewed as implicating dignity because of the denial of equal respect provided to 
others. But sexual harassment may also properly be perceived to be wrong 
because it subjects its targets to humiliating and degrading—ultimately 
disrespectful—conduct that is contrary to the right of the individual to be treated 
with the dignity that all humans deserve, even in the absence of a showing that 
notions of equality have also been offended. 
I do not pretend to be the first to suggest that the United States seek to 
incorporate notions of dignity into its sexual harassment law. In her 1997 article 
“Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect,” Professor Anita Bernstein 
challenges the use of reasonableness as the appropriate standard for judging 
sexual harassment, instead suggesting that the “respectful person” standard be 
substituted so that sexual harassment is seen as a form of disrespect and 
violation of dignity.159 But Professor Bernstein does not appear to have been 
advocating the use of dignity as an independent ground from discrimination for 
prohibiting sexual harassment, merely as a method for determining what types 
of harassment based on discrimination would violate Title VII’s prohibition on 
sexual harassment.160 Under her approach, uncivil and disrespectful conduct 
 
 156.  Wood v. Beauclair, 692 F.3d 1041, 1049, 1051 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting  Schwenk v. Hartford, 
204 F.3d 1187, 1196 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
 157.  TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-101(a)(3-4) (2006). 
 158.  29 P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 155 (2009). 
 159.  See Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 HARV. L. REV. 445, 455-92 
(1997) (critiquing the use of the reasonable person standard in sexual harassment cases as vague, 
hollow and gendered). 
 160.  That Professor Bernstein does not see dignity as a substitution for, or alternative to, the 
concept of discrimination for actionable sexual harassment claim seems clear from her statement that: 
Even when the plaintiff can clear these hurtles [summary judgment and motions to 
dismiss], and even when the defendant did not behave as a respectful person, a Title VII 
claim might fail under the respectful person standard because of its poor fit with the 
antidiscrimination purposes of the statute. Disrespectful conduct not based on sex would 
remain outside the remedial boundaries of Title VII, consistent with the view now 
prevailing in the courts. 
Id.at 505. 
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would not be actionable merely because it was uncivil and disrespectful, but only 
if it was also discriminatory. 
Professor Rosa Ehrenreich (Brooks) in her 1999 article “Dignity and 
Discrimination: Toward a Pluralistic Understanding of Workplace 
Harassment”161 also argued for inclusion of the concept of dignity as a ground 
for prohibiting sexual harassment. Her proposal was to use existing tort law to 
reach harassment that is not motivated by discrimination, noting that certain 
intentional torts, like the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, are 
largely based on notions of dignitary harm.162 She, however, is more confident 
than I am that the disadvantages of tort law—including a focus on individual 
rather than employer liability—can be overcome by public policy arguments, and 
that the occurrence of these torts in the workplace will be seen as an aggravating 
factor to allow such claims to be more easily made.163 I am skeptical that courts 
will interpret common law tort claims to provide substantial protection to men 
and women who face sexual harassment in the workplace, particularly in light of 
the general view expressed by a number of courts that the degree of 
outrageousness required for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
for example, is a very difficult standard to meet in the context of the workplace 
because a certain amount of distress is a normal part of the workplace context.164 
My proposal is more far-reaching. I am suggesting the federal statutory 
adoption of the concept of dignity as an independent ground for prohibiting 
sexual harassment, in addition to the present prohibition contained in Title VII, 
which is tied to discrimination. In a real sense, I am advocating the adoption of a 
requirement of civility and respect in the workplace. Or, rather, I am advocating 
a prohibition against some forms of uncivil and disrespectful conduct, which 
would prohibit sexual harassment even if that harassment was not linked to, or 
could not be shown to be linked to, a discriminatory motive on the part of the 
harasser or a discriminatory effect on the target of the harassment. 
I am not arguing that all forms of sexually harassing conduct in the 
workplace that implicate dignity in some slight way be prohibited by federal 
law. After all, even when courts find sexual harassment to be discrimination on 
the basis of sex, they find it to be unlawful under Title VII only if it is sufficiently 
severe or pervasive to affect the terms and conditions of employment of the 
 
 161.  Rosa Ehrenreich, Dignity and Discrimination: Toward a Pluralistic Understanding of Workplace 
Harassment, 88 GEO. L. J. 1 (1999). 
 162.  See id. at 22-32 (explaining the concept of “dignitary harm” in modern tort law and 
describing the harm as an injury to “personality interests”). 
 163.  See id. at 44-60 (suggesting that, because the notion of “abuse of power,” which is one factor 
that makes a defendant’s conduct outrageous, has been interpreted broadly in sexual harassment 
cases involving claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, dignitary harms in the 
workplace “could be seen as inherently aggravated”). 
 164.  See, e.g., Cox v. Keystone Carbon Co., 861 F.2d 390, 395 (3d Cir. 1988) (“At the outset, it must 
be recognized that it is extremely rare to find conduct in the employment context that will arise to the 
level of outrageousness necessary to provide a basis for recovery for the tort of intentional infliction 
of emotional distress.”); Wilkinson v. Hobbs Assoc., No. CV075007485, 2011 WL 3587472, at *4 (Conn. 
Super. Ct.  2011) (“[I]t is clear that individuals in the workplace reasonably should expect to 
experience some level of emotional distress, even significant emotional distress, as a result of conduct 
in the workplace.”) (quoting Perodeau v. Hartford, 792 A.2d 752, 757 (Conn. 2002)). 
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harassed employee.165 In the same way that discriminatory sexual harassment 
might be found to be “de minimus” and therefore not unlawful, sexual 
harassment that threatens the dignity interests of employees might also be found 
to be actionable only in those cases in which it is deemed to be sufficiently severe 
or pervasive to actually affect an employee’s working conditions or workplace 
environment—when the affront to dignity creates a hostile, offensive, or abusive 
environment. 
I would not, however, incorporate a requirement of unwelcomeness into 
this proposed prohibition of sexual harassment based on the concept of harm to 
dignity. Elsewhere, I have argued against the requirement of unwelcomeness for 
claims of sexual harassment under Title VII, on the grounds that such a 
requirement places an inappropriate emphasis on the conduct of the target of 
harassment rather than the harasser. There is simply no reason to require a 
showing that a woman or a man who is sexually harassed in such a way as to 
create an offensive or abusive working environment did not consent to, invite, or 
solicit that harassment, any more than it should be required that other forms of 
discrimination or harassment be shown to have been unwanted.166 Accordingly, I 
would not require a showing that sexual harassment that was sufficiently 
humiliating or degrading to violate the dignity of an employee was also 
unwanted or uninvited by the target of harassment, although in the unlikely 
event that a harassed employee actually wanted to be humiliated or degraded, a 
court might conclude that his or her dignity had not been sufficiently violated to 
state a cause of action. 
The experience of at least one other nation in using the concept of dignity as 
the basis for the prohibition on sexual harassment does suggest a need for 
caution in relying on the concept of dignity as the primary justification for sexual 
harassment laws. In her article titled “Stereotyping Women, Individualizing 
Harassment: The Dignitary Paradigm of Sex Harassment Law Between the 
Limits of Law and the Limits of Feminism,” Professor Noya Rimalt describes her 
study of court decisions interpreting Israel’s Prevention of Sexual Harassment 
Law enacted in 1998.167 She explains how Israeli feminists looked to the 
European Union model of sexual harassment and its focus on dignity as a way to 
avoid dissatisfaction with some aspects of sexual harassment law, in particular 
its focus on notions of formal equality as the measure of whether discrimination 
had occurred.168 Even though Israel’s sexual harassment statute referred to both 
equality and dignity as grounds for prohibiting sexual harassment, she describes 
 
 165.  Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993) (“Conduct that is not severe or pervasive 
enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment—an environment that a 
reasonable person would find hostile or abusive—is beyond Title VII’s purview. Likewise, if the 
victim does not subjectively perceive the environment to be abusive, the conduct has not actually 
altered the conditions of the victim’s employment, and there is no Title VII violation.”). 
 166.  See Gender Harassment, supra note 6, at 577-89 (reviewing the case law interpreting, and 
critiquing the rationales for, the “unwelcomeness” requirement). 
 167.  Noya Rimalt, Stereotyping Women, Individualizing Harassment: The Dignitary Paradigm of 
Sexual Harassment Law Between the Limits of Law and the Limits of Feminism, 19 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 
391 (2008). 
 168.  See id. at 395-410 (reviewing the historical development of Israel’s Prevention of Sexual 
Harassment Law). 
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how courts have prioritized dignity harms over equality harms, essentially 
seeing sexual harassment as a harm to individual women rather than as a group-
based harm against women more generally.169 She also indicates that Israeli 
courts deciding cases of sexual harassment have taken a paternalistic and 
moralistic approach to women complaining of sexual harassment, emphasizing 
their need for protection and the moral failings of the men who have harassed 
them, ultimately stereotyping women as frail, vulnerable, and in need of 
protection from challenges to their modesty and honor rather than their 
equality.170 
Professor Rimalt suggests several reasons for this negative turn of events, 
including the fact that equality was listed as the final of the values supporting 
the enactment of the sexual harassment legislation, behind dignity, liberty, and 
privacy.171 She also argues that the decision to criminalize sexual harassment was 
also partially responsible for these negative effects, because that decision meant 
that sexual harassment became associated with other sexual offenses, so that 
sexual harassment was thought of as sex activity and the fault of an individual 
man, rather than as associated with gender and societal inequality.172 
I take seriously the potential risks of a focus on dignity as the justification 
for prohibiting sexual harassment to the exclusion of equality. For a number of 
reasons, however, I think that there is less potential danger in incorporating 
notions of dignity into the sexual harassment law of the United States. In Israel, 
the prohibition of sexual harassment is a relatively recent phenomenon, dating 
only from 1988.173 By contrast, in the United States, sexual harassment has been 
prohibited on a federal level, at least nominally, since 1965 and has been 
recognized as a form of sexual discrimination since the late 1970s or early 
1980s.174 Accordingly, courts in the United States have generally conceived of 
sexual harassment in terms of discrimination; it seems unlikely that 
incorporating the concept of dignity as another justification for prohibiting 
sexual harassment will cause courts to abandon the concept of sexual harassment 
as discrimination entirely, although it is possible that such an action could cause 
less emphasis to be placed on discrimination and the aspects of sexual 
harassment that are both caused by and create gender inequality. 
Additionally, I do not propose a criminalization of sexual harassment, as 
has occurred in France and in Israel, so there is less reason for courts to directly 
link sexual harassment with sex crimes, such as sexual assault and rape. I believe 
that even courts that are willing to condemn harassers civilly will be much less 
 
 169.  Id. at 413. 
 170.  See id. at 414-41. 
 171. Id. at 442.  The Israeli sexual harassment statute indicated that its objective was “to prohibit 
sexual harassment, in order to protect human dignity, liberty and privacy and in order to promote 
equality between the sexes.” Prevention of Sexual Harassment Law, 5758-1998, SH No. 166 p. 1. 
 172.  See Rimalt, supra note 167, at 442-44 (also noting that the association between sexual 
harassment and other sex crimes “allowed a moralistic conceptualization to dominate the dignitary 
harm of harassment,” diverting attention to “women’s honor,” among other unintended 
consequences of criminalization). 
 173.  Id. at 401-02. 
 174.  For discussion of the evolution of the law of sexual harassment as a form of sex 
discrimination, see Hébert, supra note 5, at 439-47. 
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likely to impose criminal sanctions on those harassers; accordingly, I believe that 
criminalization of sexual harassment in a number of nations has contributed to 
the underenforcement of those sexual harassment laws, a result I would not like 
to see occur— or worsen— in the United States. 
One might reasonably ask whether my proposal goes far enough. After all, I 
am not proposing (in this article) that all forms of harassment be included within 
this proposed statutory prohibition on sexual harassment based on the concept 
of sexual harassment as a violation of dignity. I am not proposing (in this article) 
the adoption in the United States of a federal statutory claim similar to a claim of 
moral harassment in France or a claim of “bullying,” as has been advocated by 
Professor David Yamada in numerous publications.175 One might reasonably 
argue that if sexual harassment is to be prohibited not only because it is 
discriminatory but also because it violates the dignity rights of harassed 
employees, why other forms of harassment that are injurious to employees’ 
dignity should not also be prohibited. 
I am sympathetic to those concerns, but am not yet ready to take on the 
general hostility of American employers to the imposition of a “general civility 
code,” even though I am generally in favor of civility in the workplace and do 
not see the same risks that others do in requiring that employers be civil to their 
employees, or at least that they refrain from certain types of uncivil behavior—
generally behavior that is degrading and humiliating and would violate the 
dignity interests of those employees. Instead I am making a more modest 
proposal: that conduct that is already often prohibited in the workplace—
sexually humiliating and degrading conduct that is severe or pervasive enough 
to create a hostile, abusive, or offensive environment for the employees subjected 
to that conduct—be found to be unlawful when it violates the dignity of the 
harassed employee, regardless of what is found to have motivated that conduct. 
That is, the law should equally prohibit such sexually humiliating and degrading 
conduct, whether the conduct is undertaken because a supervisor or co-worker 
does not like women (or men) in general, because the supervisor or co-worker 
does not like women (or men) in a particular job or position, because the 
supervisor or co-worker does not like this particular woman or man, or because 
of some other reason. The harm of sexually humiliating and degrading conduct 
should be recognized as harmful to the dignity of employees, regardless of 
whether the courts recognize that the equality interests of employees may also be 
implicated. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For much of its history, France’s law concerning sexual harassment has been 
narrower and more restrictive than the sexual harassment law of the United 
States, but, unlike the United States’ prohibition of sexual harassment, France’s 
prohibition has not been focused on the concept of discrimination. Recently, 
France appears to have significantly broadened its prohibition on sexual 
harassment, as part of its reenactment of a provision of the Penal Code that was 
 
 175.  E.g., David C. Yamada, Workplace Bullying and American Employment Law: A Ten-Year Progress 
Report and Assessment, 32 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 251 (2010). 
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declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Council. Influenced by the 
European Union Directives on harassment, France has incorporated the concept 
of violation of dignity into its prohibition on sexual harassment, so that 
degrading and humiliating conduct of a sexual nature can constitute sexual 
harassment when that conduct results in a violation of an individual’s dignity. 
In this article, I have argued that the United States should take a lesson from 
the French law of sexual harassment—and should broaden its notion of sexual 
harassment beyond just a form of discrimination to also recognize that sexual 
harassment, even if not established as discriminatory in nature, should be 
prohibited precisely because sexually harassing conduct is degrading and 
humiliating, and therefore offensive to and violative of human dignity. I have 
argued that the concept of dignity be recognized as an alternative and 
independent ground for condemning sexual harassment under federal statutory 
employment law. I have argued that sexual harassment should be prohibited 
even if it is divorced from sex. 
 
